Jared Taylor and Paul Kersey analyze Starbucks’ policy of mandatory company-wide sackcloth and ashes after a store manager is accused of “racism,” and note that Cal Poly has also handed out collective punishment for isolated acts of “cultural appropriation.” They discuss the sad story of now-shuttered Charlotte Law School, and Jared Taylor talks about his recent European speaking tour. They conclude with passages from Enoch Powell’s great “Rivers of Blood” speech, which was delivered exactly 50 years ago.
Archive for Jared Taylor
Crying Wolf: Hate Crime Hoaxes in America, Laird Wilcox, Editorial Research Service, 1994, 128 pp., $19.95 (spiral bound).
Any country that makes heroes out of victims of “hate crimes” is bound to produce some false heroes. Crying Wolf, by Laird Wilcox, is probably the only full-length study of these false heroes — people who pretend to be victims of “racist” aggression in order to benefit from the sympathy that ensues. This thoughtful, informative account is based on the author’s many years of observing radical groups, both left and right.
Hate crime hoaxes are a byproduct of America’s peculiar hysteria over “racism.” Some people who stage “racist” outrages simply cannot resist the payoff: “instant fame, instant sympathy, and often in some form or another, instant compensation,” as Mr. Wilcox puts it. Others invent hate crimes to “prove” that whites are evil and to heighten racial consciousness among their own group. One first-rate racial scandal can do the work of years of propaganda.
It is impossible to say how many “hate crimes” are hoaxes, partly because this is a problem no one studies. Governments, police departments, and “anti-hate” groups carefully collect statistics on every victimization claim, so hoaxes and staged events are counted along with the real thing. Mr. Wilcox cannot find evidence of any procedure to subtract even the proven hoaxes from hate crime totals, and he suspects that many of the most common unsolved incidents — anonymous graffiti and threatening telephone calls — may well be self inflicted.
Mr. Wilcox has done informal research by asking college administrators how many of the racial incidents on their campuses are fake. He reports that replies range from “a few, not too many,” to “damned near all of them.” Whenever the victim of a real attack gets the hero treatment, imitators are likely to spring up, hoping to share the adulation.
People of all races make false claims but Mr. Wilcox reports that blacks are responsible for the largest number, followed by Jews. Interestingly, the motives of the two groups are often different.
Although some black activists, especially students, fake racial incidents to “raise consciousness about racism,” the book’s findings suggest that blacks are more likely to use a hoax to cover up something. By contrast, Jews almost invariably stage an event for its own sake.
Tawana Brawley, who is perhaps the best known of all phony victims, is probably a typical black hoaxer. In 1987 she claimed to have been abducted and raped by white policemen — but not particularly because she wanted to stir up black hatred for whites. She invented the story to explain an unexcused absence for which she feared her step father would beat her. It was her handlers — Al Sharpton and Alton Maddox — who turned the incident into anti-white propaganda.
Mr. Wilcox writes of many blacks who invent a racial incident to cover up mistakes. A black who accidentally shot himself in the hand claimed that racists had attacked him. A young man playing with gasoline burned himself and then said whites set him on fire. A woman who accidentally spilled acid on herself at a summer job claimed that racists had thrown it on her. A young man damaged the family car when he drove it into a ditch but told police whites were responsible. Another had a smash-up in a stolen car and then pretended violent racists had broken his jaw and knocked out his teeth.
Sometimes when blacks commit crimes against other blacks they try to throw the police off their trails by making the crime look like a hate crime. One killer carved “KKK” on the leg of his victim. Other blacks have burned down their own houses to get insurance money but scrawled racial insults on the premises to make it look as though whites set the fires.
Sabrina Collins, another famous hoaxer, also used fake racial incidents as a diversion. In 1990, when she was a student at Emory University, she repeatedly vandalized her dormitory room but claimed that whites had done it. In the outpouring of sympathy and attention that followed, it was all but forgotten that she had just been accused of cheating on an examination.
Mr. Wilcox’s evidence suggests that Jews rarely stage “anti-Semitic” incidents to cover up accidents or embarrassment. A more frequent motivation is the desire to heighten what they see as insufficient Jewish vigilance in a hostile Gentile world. Jews who spraypaint swastikas on synagogues are usually fanatic anti-anti-Semites who need “proof” that the world hates Jews. In Israel, West Bank settlers have been known to fire-bomb Jewish installations in the hope of provoking greater hostility towards Arabs.
At a more prosaic level, some Jews concoct hate crimes to cover up insurance fraud. In 1991, in Germantown, Maryland, Susan and Curtis Klein found their townhouse systematically vandalized, and daubed with swastikas. In the wake of wide publicity, five hundred people volunteered to help the couple clean up. Businesses donated refreshments for the volunteers, and a hauling company offered to move the debris for free. Neighbors organized a raffle to raise money for the Kleins, and newspapers printed an address to which donations could be sent. Mr. Klein’s story eventually unraveled and he was charged with insurance fraud.
In one of the sillier recent incidents, Jewish television personality Mort Downey claimed in 1989 that skinheads attacked him in an airport men’s room and carved a swastika on his face. This fraud, apparently designed to boost disappointing ratings, was quickly exposed.
Attacks on Jews, with the evocations of Nazism that often follow, can be such effective attention-getters that non-Jews have resorted to them. Mr. Wilcox reports the strange case of a Gentile who set fire to his own house and then claimed that it was the work of unknown anti-Semites who thought he was a Jew.
In another curious case, the non-Jewish owner of a Los Angeles security company desecrated a Jewish cemetery in East Los Angeles. Not detectably anti-Semitic himself, he apparently wanted to discredit the cemetery’s current security company so that his own firm could get the job.
Whites sometimes accuse blacks of imaginary crimes but it is usually for a straightforward reason: to cover up their own crimes. They implicate blacks because blacks are plausible perpetrators; they do not claim to be victims of racism. Mr. Wilcox has not found a single case of a white who implicated a black for any other reason, nor is he likely to. White victims of black crime do not become heroes, so there is no psychological payoff. Also, since white racial consciousness is largely unaroused by even the most blatant anti-white crimes, white activists have little reason to be agents provocateurs.
Although it happened too late to be included in Mr. Wilcox’s book, Susan Smith of South Carolina became famous just last year for a typical fraud: She appears to have murdered her two children and then claimed that a black man abducted them. In a similar incident in 1989, Charles Stuart of Boston shot his pregnant wife and then wounded himself, later claiming that a black had attacked them. His motive was to collect on his wife’s life insurance, and he killed himself when his story fell apart. At the outset, both hoaxers got sympathy, but not the hero treatment deserved for victims of “racism.”
Another difference between black (or Jewish) and white hoaxes is the media reaction. Coverage only intensified when Susan Smith and Charles Stuart were exposed as frauds, and they are almost as famous for “racism” as for murder. Plenty of whites agonized in print over the terrible damage these false accusations had done to race relations.
This does not happen when hoaxers seek to pin the blame on whites. They cease to be news as soon as their game is discovered — unless the original coverage was so lavish the denouement cannot be ignored. As Mr. Wilcox observes, newspaper editors downplay hoaxes to avoid “giving ammunition to racists.” Also, non-white and Jewish spokesmen almost never apologize to the community on behalf of the hoaxer.
Instead, anti-racists often try to milk a fake incident as if it were real. The lawyer William Kunstler said of the Tawana Brawley case:
It makes no difference anymore whether the attack on Tawana really happened . . . a lot of black women are treated the way she says she was treated.
When a series of well-reported “anti-Semitic” crimes was found to be the work of the “victim,” a representative of the Anti-Defamation League said:
The tragedy of Nathan Kobrin [the perpetrator] in no way discounts or diminishes the reality of increased anti-Semitism and the increase throughout society in hate crimes.
Otis Smith of the Atlanta chapter of the NAACP could not help pointing out how useful Sabrina Collins’ hoax really was:
It doesn’t matter to me whether she did it or not, because of all the pressure these black students are under at these predominantly white schools. If this will highlight it, if it will bring it to the attention of the public, I have no problem with that.
Moreover, when hoaxers are caught they are usually found to be “troubled youths” who deserve leniency. A good example of this was the case of a young man who set a series of fires in synagogues and Jewish community centers in West Hartford, Connecticut in 1983. This “anti-Semite” so terrorized the community that the mayor offered a $50,000 reward for his arrest. When he was finally caught and found to be Jewish, the monster quickly became “a troubled and alienated 17-year-old,” and editorials called for understanding. The arsonist was given a suspended sentence and five years probation.
Bona fide racial vandals and arsonists get different treatment. They go to jail rather than to the psychologist. As Mr. Wilcox points out, hate crime laws have now piled so many additional penalties onto racist acts that a white who paints “nigger” on a black man’s store is likely to be more severely punished than a black who burgles it.
Mr. Wilcox argues that provocations by real racists and anti-Semites never do the perpetrators any good. The community always supports the victims and mounts a crusade for “tolerance” and “sensitivity.” Mr. Wilcox recounts the strange case of a genuine anti-Semite in Salem, Massachusetts who was caught painting over anti-Semitic graffiti on a synagogue. He said the graffiti would create a false impression of anti-Jewish hostility, which Jews would use to their advantage.
After years of observing both the radicals and the anti-radicals who combat them, Mr. Wilcox concludes that there are far fewer “racists” and other bad guys than either side would have us believe. The “hate group” haters, such as the Anti-Defamation League, the Simon Wiesenthal Center, the Southern Poverty Law Center, and the Center for Democratic Renewal have no reason to exist unless America is awash with dangerous bigots. These groups invariably magnify the threat, and their opponents happily play along.
Mr. Wilcox writes of something called the Farmers’ Liberation Army that, after national media attention in 1984, was found to have one member. As Mr. Wilcox explains, “A creative trickster with access to a photocopy machine can create havoc in a community with the help of a properly ‘sensitized’ local media on the watch for witches to burn.”
A study like Crying Wolf was long overdue. For obvious reasons, it is not published by a mainstream press, but is being distributed privately by the author. Unfortunately, it looks it. The book has a spiral binding and although it is perfectly readable, it is not typeset but printed in a typewriter font. Twenty dollars is a lot to pay for a book in this format, but the information it contains can be found nowhere else.
[Editor’s Note: For specific instances of hate crime hoaxes, see here.]
South Africa’s ANC regime is about to pass a draconian piece of legislation on “hate speech” directly aimed at whites. However, even before “The Prevention and Combating of Hate Crime and Hate Speech Bill” could become law, a minor district judge or “magistrate” in Randburg, a suburb of Johannesburg, sentenced Vicki Momberg to an effective two years prison sentence for using the “K-word” in an altercation with a black policeman.
In South Africa the term “kaffir” (“heathen” in Arabic) is the equivalent of the US “N-word”. Both white liberals and members of the black elite have become obsessed with the word, which to them is the apotheosis of white racism. So when a cellphone video of Vicki Momberg, an estate agent from the coastal city of Durban, began circulating on social media in 2016, the full might of the state was brought to bear on her in a way that would be unthinkable if she were black.
She had just been robbed in her car by blacks in a smash-and-grab attack, but that counted for nothing and was not even taken into account by the female Indian magistrate. Pravina Raghoonandan sentenced her to three years’ incarceration, of which one year was suspended for three years. In a country where vicious crimes such as murder, rape, and torture are commonplace, meting out such a heavy sentence to someone who had merely breached a language taboo seemed outrageous. But of course, Miss Momberg was white, and the police constable she had insulted in February 2016, David Mkhondo, was black.
After being found guilty of crimen injuria, an old-fashioned form of criminal libel in South Africa, Miss Momberg was led to the court cells and spent her first night behind bars in Soweto’s notorious all-black prison for hardened criminals, nick-named “Sun City”, after the casino resort.
Crimen injuria is a common-law crime in South Africa that is defined as “unlawfully, intentionally and seriously impairing the dignity of another.” Although it fell by the wayside in modern times, it has been used in recent years by South Africa’s ANC regime to persecute whites suspected of a “racist” attitude. The new “hate crimes” bill will curtail freedom of speech even further and make it easier to prosecute whites who rebel against black authority.
During her argument with police while reporting the attack on her, Miss Momberg used the word “kaffir” 48 times, according to court documents. This fact was emphasized repeatedly in mainstream media reports about, supposedly because it made her flaunting of the rules that much more egregious and worthy of punishment.
The Star newspaper in Johannesburg carried the headline “Victory over racism.” Adriaan Basson, the editor of News24.com, the country’s largest online news portal, entitled his piece on Miss Momberg, “Nowhere to hide for racists like Vicki Momberg anymore.” According to Mr. Basson, “It is the first time (that I am aware of) that someone will be imprisoned for using racist language in our country’s history.”
Some blacks on social media were calling for the death penalty for Vicki Momberg, a legal impossibility, since our liberal Constitutional Court had abolished it, mainly to protect the almost 100 percent black and colored class of murderers who kill about 50,000 people every year.
A poll by the public broadcaster, the SABC, found that 57 percent of its TV viewers were in favor of a still harsher sentence of “more than five years imprisonment” for Vicki Momberg. In fact, most murderers in South Africa only serve an effective term of five years before they are let out on parole, especially if they behave well.
South Africa’s main opposition party, the liberal DA (Democratic Alliance), which heavily depends on white voters, welcomed the prison sentence: “We trust this ruling will be a deterrent to those who harbor any racist sentiments.”
A lone liberal-Marxist commentator, Rebecca Davis, expressed concern over the effect the sentence might have on freedom of speech. Writing on the Daily Maverick website, she said:
It has been reported that the case is the first in South Africa in which a person found guilty only of crimen injuria has been sentenced to prison. . . . The freedom of expression implications of this will need to be teased out by legal experts.
“Teased out by legal experts.” Yes, sure. If you’re white, you insult or complain to a black official at your peril. Thanks to affirmative action, the entire state bureaucracy is loaded with officials who are hardly literate, whether in the police, the court system, or at the Internal Revenue Service. White taxpayers regularly lose money from their bank accounts, since black bureaucrats can act completely unreasonably according to special legislation that lets them confiscate funds without a court order. The cumulative effect of all this is a smoldering anger on both sides of the racial divide that could erupt at any moment.
In June 2017, Miss Momberg was fined R100,000 ($8,500) by the Equality Court, which she had to pay to the black policeman she had offended. However, proceedings in South Africa’s Equality Courts take place under civil, not criminal law, unlike the charge of crimen injuria.
In effect, Miss Momberg had to pay both civil damages and go to prison for using the word “kaffir.” Although the court was told that Miss Momberg had previously refused to be served by black policemen in Durban more than a decade ago, she had never been convicted of an offense. Legally, she was therefore a first offender, and would under normal conditions have qualified for a lighter, suspended sentence, a fine, or a combination of the two.
A South African lawyer, Advocate Albert Murphy, characterized the sentence as “disproportionate.” He tweeted:
In my view the Momberg judgment is disproportionate and obviously politically inspired. What she did was wrong but certainly did not justify a prison sentence. White people are daily subjected to vile and murderous comments and songs from public platforms and no action is taken?
Miss Momberg’s case contrasts vividly with that of Velaphi Khumalo, an ANC member and official of the provincial arts and culture department in the Gauteng Province. He wrote on Facebook that “white people in South Africa deserve to be hacked and killed like Jews.”
After a public outcry, Khumalo was finally charged by the Human Rights Commission with “hate speech.” Unlike Vicki Momberg, who merely used an offensive word, Mr. Khumalo called for white genocide. However, to date he has not only kept his job as a provincial official, but his “prosecution” by the Human Rights Commission has also been extremely protracted and without any visible result.
The Momberg case has demonstrated that giving offense to blacks is a serious crime in South Africa. In the moments before her outburst, Vicki Momberg was robbed violently and her car broken into with her behind the wheel. Probably, the perpetrators will never be brought to book, while she was persecuted for her verbal transgression in a fashion reminiscent of Soviet “show trials,” meant to bolster the regime and instill fear in potential opponents.
The cynicism and schadenfreude of white liberals also fit the Soviet mold, as in this tweet by a blonde woman from Cape Town in which she looks forward to having her elderly racist relatives taken away from family braais (barbecues).
There is a slim chance that Miss Momberg’s sentence could be reduced on appeal. But the Indian magistrate denied her bail, pending the appeal, so she would have to stay in prison while first applying for leave to appeal and then the appeal itself, which could take at least a year. By the time she gets to a more reasonable judge, she might have served her two years. South African prisons have deteriorated to a third-world level, and Vicki Momberg’s safety is by no means assured.
It is significant that during the drawn-out murder trial of disabled athlete Oscar Pistorius, he was allowed out on bail until the moment when he had finally exhausted all appeals. Clearly, in South Africa it is not so serious to kill someone as to say the word “kaffir,” which seems to be an affront not only to individual blacks, but also to the system of black supremacy under which we live.
The post Vicki Momberg: South Africa Becomes the USSR of Race appeared first on American Renaissance.
Jared Taylor and Paul Kersey discuss a week of good news from the Trump administration: Liberians whose departure has been “deferred” since 1999 will have to go home, immigrants getting “non-cash public benefits” will have a hard time staying, the census will ask about citizenship, and the monstrous racial engineering program called Affirmatively Furthering Fair Housing has been defunded. And, as icing on the cake, the New York Times admitted that the behavior of “populations” is likely to differ for genetic reasons.
Congressman Keith Ellison, Deputy Chair of the Democratic Party, has long been friendly with the Nation of Islam and its leader Louis Farrakhan. Rep. Ellison has denied it, but the ties are finally getting mild media attention. It’s not hard to imagine the frenzy that would erupt if it turned out that the second in command of the GOP were friendly with, say, American Renaissance.
Rep. Ellison and the Nation go back a long way. At a recent conference, Louis Farrakhan bragged that the congressman used to be a member, and sold the group’s newspaper, The Final Call. And Rep. Ellison does have a long history as an out-and-out black nationalist.
On February 2, 1990, writing under the name of Keith E. Hakim, the future Congressman wrote a column calling for a “black state” to be established in Arkansas, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, and Mississippi. He said blacks should “have the option of choosing their own land base or remaining in the United States.” Of course, having “their own land base” would mean dissolving the Union.
Five years later, in 1995, now writing under the name of Keith X Ellison, he called Mr. Farrakhan “a role model for black youth” and “not an anti-Semite.” In 1998, he was sporting the name Ellison-Muhammad and said he was “affiliated” with the Nation of Islam.
Today, of course, Congressman Ellison no longer talks about a black ethnostate and is content to live among white people and lobby for more wealth transfers from us. Yet his relationship with Louis Farrakhan and the Nation did not end once he entered public office as a Minnesota state representative in 2002.
In 2006, when he was first elected to Congress and evidence of his old ties resurfaced, he renounced the Nation, writing “I have long since distanced myself from and rejected the Nation of Islam due to its propagation of bigoted and anti-Semitic ideas and statements, as well as other issues.”
The “distancing” didn’t go very far. The Daily Caller reports that the congressman and Mr. Farrakhan appear in a video taken at a reception, in which they stand about six feet away from each other, casually talking to others at the reception. The video, posted by the Dar Al Hijrah Islamic Center in Virginia, is of a meeting that reportedly took place some time after 2010.
The Wall Street Journal reports that Congressman Ellison and Louis Farrakhan attended a 2013 dinner in Manhattan hosted by Iranian president Hassan Rouhani. The Nation of Islam’s own website covered the event and ran photos of both Mr. Farrakhan and Rep. Ellison.
Mr. Farrakhan says he had a private visit in his hotel suite in 2015 with both Congressman Ellison and Congressman Andre Carson of Illinois—the only other black Muslim in Congress. Rep. Carson has confirmed he was there; Rep. Ellison denies it. Someone is lying. Even the Washington Post thinks Congressman Ellison is dishonest in claiming to have cut Louis Farrakhan since 2006, awarding him “four Pinocchios.”
Rep. Ellison still denies everything. On March 18, in a note on the website Medium, he wrote, “I do not have and have never had a relationship with Mr. Farrakhan,” though he admits, “I have been in the same room as him.” The Daily Caller is laughing at this denial.
According to “The Muslim Program” on its own website, the Nation calls for a separate black state. It adds: “We believe that intermarriage or race mixing should be prohibited.” Imagine what would happen to a white politician who had even the most tenuous connection to a group that wanted a white homeland and an end to miscegenation.
Yet for Democrats, it’s no problem. Only a few weeks ago, a 13-year-old photo of Barack Obama posing with Louis Farrakhan was made public. The reporter who took the picture hid it so as not to hurt Barack Obama’s political career. Would it have made any difference if he hadn’t?
The Daily Caller reports that Congresswoman Maxine Waters attended a Nation of Islam conference and was even recognized from the stage. The paper also reports that Louis Farrakhan has met with several other members of the Congressional Black Caucus. Even the mild public hand-wringing over this sounds mostly pro forma. Everyone seems to understand that black racial consciousness is more or less universal. Needless to say, during the presidential campaign, Donald Trump was repeatedly accused of being a “white nationalist”—and a “racist,” “fascist,” “sexist,” etc.
Of course, I agree with racial self-determination. Every race needs a home of its own. Evidently, almost everyone else agrees, except for whites. But the Nation of Islam goes much further than that. Everyone knows about Mr. Farrakhan’s criticism of Jews. Far less well known are his remarks in 2015, when he said whites “deserve to die,” and his speech in February this year when he said “white folks are going down.”
The Nation of Islam also claims whites are inferior mutants created by a mad black scientist named “Yakub.” About the only thing sillier would be pretending race is a social construct. Of course, the mainstream media don’t seem to care about attacks on whites, and when Congressman Ellison is trying to repudiate Mr. Farrakhan, he criticizes anti-Semitism—not assertions that whites “deserve to die.”
White advocates don’t say other races are “devils” or were created by a mad scientist. We believe race exists, that it has consequences, and that whites have the right to pursue their own interests, just like anyone else. That should make us far more “mainstream” than the Nation of Islam, but that’s not the case. Our upcoming conference from April 27 – 29 will be filled to capacity, but so far, no congressmen have registered.
Even if we were to believe that Rep. Ellison has cut ties with the Nation of Islam, his extremism is hardly a thing of the past. He recently tweeted out a picture of himself seemingly endorsing a book promoting antifa, the far-left group that assaults its opponents. The book’s author, Mark Bray, explicitly endorses violence against Trump voters:
Our goal should be that in twenty years those who voted for Trump are too uncomfortable to share that fact in public. We may not always be able to change someone’s beliefs, but we sure as hell can make it politically, socially, economically and sometimes physically costly to articulate them.
Sixty million Americans voted for Donald Trump. Is Rep. Ellison endorsing a man who wants to inflict pain on all 60 million? You don’t even have to be a race realist to be a potential antifa target.
Our views will eventually be mainstream. They are in conformity with history and human nature and are morally unimpeachable. Hypocrites in the media have no right to tell us we can’t take our own side. Neither does Keith Ellison.
Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Democracy — The God that Failed: The Economics and Politics of Monarchy, Democracy and Natural Order, Transaction Publishers, 2001, $44.95 ($24.95 softcover), 304 pp.
Libertarians, to the extent they have any influence on American policy, have been bitter opponents of immigration control. From the Cato Institute, to the Libertarian Party, to the editorial pages of the Wall Street Journal, their generally laudable opposition to government control leads them to view border control as just one more intolerable act of government tyranny. A Journal editorial on July 3, 1990 put the matter as bluntly as possible when it proposed an amendment to the Constitution: “There shall be open borders.”
Hans-Hermann Hoppe, professor of economics at University of Nevada Las Vegas, is a different kind of libertarian. He shares — even surpasses — the usual libertarian contempt for government intrusion and compulsion, but recognizes “free immigration” for what it is: forcing strangers into communities of natives who want to be left alone. Prof. Hoppe recognizes that the right to discriminate, to keep out undesirables, is a fundamental freedom that only the servile would ever give up.
This forceful correction of the mistaken view of immigration in what Prof. Hoppe calls “left-liberal libertarianism” — the kind that attracts nudists, homosexuals, dope smokers, and misfits of all kinds — is just one of the excellent points he makes in a book that is as potentially subversive as The Communist Manifesto.
Our Enemy, the Government
The classic, liberal position has been that the only legitimate function of government is to protect property against crime, fraud, and foreign invasion. However, as Prof. Hoppe points out, even when a government is chartered with limited powers, it develops a taste for bossing people around, and expands its reach. In the United States, despite a Constitution that lists federal powers and even states clearly the government has no powers not specifically granted, bureaucrats now run a “protection” racket that goes well beyond property. Prof. Hoppe writes:
In the name of social, public or national security, our caretakers ‘protect’ us from global warming and cooling and the extinction of animals and plants, from husbands and wives, parents and employers, poverty, disease, disaster, ignorance, prejudice, racism, sexism, homophobia, and countless other public enemies and dangers.
Prof. Hoppe argues that it is in the very nature of government — which he defines as “a territorial monopoly of compulsion” — to increase its powers and exploit citizens: “Once the principle of government — judicial monopoly and the power to tax — is incorrectly accepted as just, any notion of restraining government power and safeguarding individual liberty and property is illusory.” In his view, the solution is not to tinker with policy, thereby leaving the monopolist of compulsion in place, but to abolish government entirely and turn over its few useful functions to private, competing organizations. Whether his proposed substitute for government would actually work (more about which below), his critique of public power is relentless and devastating.
All government is bad, but some kinds are worse than others, and Prof. Hoppe argues strongly that democracy is much worse than monarchy. The crux of his argument is that kings behave like owners who want to keep up the value of their property, while democratically elected rulers act like tenants who want to get as much out of their temporary occupancy as possible. A king has a proprietary, long-term interest in his country and wants to pass it on to his heirs in the best possible condition. A president is different: “Instead of maintaining or even enhancing the value of the government estate as a king would do, a president . . . will use up as much of the government resources as quickly as possible, for what he does not consume now, he may never be able to consume.”
Likewise, kings are not in the business of large-scale transfer of wealth from one class of citizens to another. There are limits to what the nobles and the people will tolerate, and it is clear to everyone if a king unfairly takes something from a subject and gives it to another. Prof. Hoppe recognizes that the popular image of monarchy is one of ruthless exploitation, but points out that not even the most powerful kings had anything like the tax-gathering powers common in democratic countries. In no monarchy did taxation even begin to approach levels now universal in Europe and the United States.
Democracy is the perfect system for the tax man. First, it promotes the false idea that people are equal, which leads to indignation over inequality of wealth and income. “There is nothing ethically wrong with inequality,” Prof. Hoppe explains, but politicians win office by promising to reduce it. This means redistribution, or seizing someone’s property and giving it to someone else. Because people have the illusion that it is “their” government that taxes them, and because the money does not go right out of one man’s pockets into another’s — as it would in a straightforward robbery — democratic citizens are much easier to loot than subjects of a king.
Even more important, since democratic government theoretically offers anyone the chance to win office or to persuade the taxing authorities to hand over some of the loot, it fosters a spirit of larceny: “Everyone may openly covet everyone else’s property, as long as he appeals to democracy; and everyone may act on his desire for another man’s property, provided that he finds entrance into government.” Furthermore, since candidates win office by appealing to covetousness, “advocacy and adoption of redistributive policies is predestined to become the very prerequisite for anyone wanting to attain or retain a government caretaker position,” and “prime ministers and presidents are selected for their proven efficiency as morally uninhibited demagogues.” Kings, by contrast, are not necessarily bad men. Some may be harmless dilettantes or even far-sighted patriarchs.
Prof. Hoppe points out that the broader the franchise, the greater the socialist vote. Welfare programs do not arise when only white male property owners can vote, as was originally the case in the United States. However, it is not shiftless dullards who milk democratic systems best; it is clever manipulators who arrange for such things as farm subsidies, protection from imports, arts grants, or free public university education for their children. “Democracy is immoral,” writes Prof. Hoppe, “. . . [because] it allows for A and B to band together to rip off C .”
The combination of egalitarian thinking and government lust for power results in what may be democracy’s worst offense: welfare. Subsidies for single mothers reward reckless procreation. Subsidies for the poor reward laziness. Social Security and Medicare reward heedless consumption rather than saving for retirement. All these programs reduce the need for family loyalty because they make it possible for people to live at public expense rather than count on kinsmen.
What is worse, undermining the family undermines the one social unit government has never before been able to invade. The millions of people dependent on government rather than on family members can be brazenly manipulated by social worker busy-bodies. As Prof. Hoppe puts it: The welfare state “uproot[s] individuals from their families to isolate and atomize them, thereby increasing the state’s power over them . . . From the point of view of the government’s rulers, their ability to interfere in internal family matters must be regarded as the ultimate prize and pinnacle of their own power.” Kings had no interest in transfer payments, much less the money to pay for them.
Immigration policies of democratic governments are also vastly inferior to those of monarchies. Kings want to improve the quality of their kingdoms, encouraging immigration of skilled workers and expelling criminals, losers and incompetents. As Prof. Hoppe explains, democratic governments may want more losers and incompetents:
[B]ums and unproductive people may well be preferred as residents and citizens, because they create more so-called ‘social problems,’ and democratic rulers thrive on the existence of such problems. Moreover, bums and inferior people will likely support egalitarian policies, whereas geniuses and superior people will not. The result of this policy of non-discrimination [in immigration policy] is forced integration: the forcing of masses of inferior immigrants onto domestic property owners who, if the decision were left to them, would have sharply discriminated and chosen very different neighbors for themselves.
As a libertarian, Prof. Hoppe is a strong advocate of free trade, but scorns the idea that it must go hand in hand with “free immigration,” which is conceptually entirely different. Free trade occurs only when there are willing sellers and buyers of goods; imports cross borders only when they are wanted. Immigrants walk across the border whether they are wanted or not. Even if there are employers who want immigrants, it does not follow that other citizens want to share parks, schools, shopping malls, streets, and movie theaters with them. Therefore, if capitalists really want foreign workers, they should keep them in self-sufficient company towns rather than force them on the public.
Prof. Hoppe recognizes that antipathy towards those outside one’s own group is perfectly natural, but it need not interfere with trade:
From the fact that one does not want to associate with or live in the neighborhood of Blacks, Turks, Catholics or Hindus, etc., it does not follow that one does not want to trade with them from a distance. To the contrary, it is precisely the absolute voluntariness of human association and separation — the absence of any form of forced integration — that makes peaceful relationships — free trade — between culturally, racially, ethnically, or religiously distinct people possible.
As Prof. Hoppe explains, whether domestically or internationally, “private property means discrimination.” When people have lost the right to discriminate they have lost the use of their property. Moreover, “a society in which the right to exclusion is fully restored to owners of private property would be profoundly unegalitarian, intolerant, and discriminatory,” which is why democratic societies fear this basic freedom.
Prof. Hoppe argues that the power of exclusion should revert to “states, provinces, cities, towns, villages, residential districts, and ultimately to private property owners and their voluntary associations.” Just as households do, towns or neighborhoods have every right to keep out anyone they don’t like. Restrictive covenants in property agreements should likewise be legal, so people can establish neighborhoods that suit them. Instead, Prof. Hoppe points out, “every nook and cranny of American society is affected by government management and forced integration; accordingly, social strife and racial, ethnic, and moral-cultural tension and hostility have increased dramatically.”
Race is only one of many criteria on which the right to discriminate should be restored:
Not to be able to exclude others means not to be able to protect oneself. The result of this erosion of private property rights under the democratic welfare state is forced integration. Forced integration is ubiquitous. Americans must accept immigrants they do not want. Teachers cannot get rid of lousy or ill-behaved students, employers are stuck with poor or destructive employees, landlords are forced to live with bad renters, banks and insurance companies are not allowed to avoid bad risks, restaurants and bars must accommodate unwelcome customers, and private clubs and covenants are compelled to accept members and actions in violation of their very own rules and restrictions.
And, as government control seeps into every corner of American life, legislation and regulation metastasize. The Code of Federal Regulations now takes up 26 feet of shelf space, “revealing the almost totalitarian power of democratic government.” No king ever dreamed of telling his citizens whom they could or could not hire, how much wheat they could or could not plant, or where they could or could not have a smoke.
Besides being a libertarian, Prof. Hoppe is a conservative who “believes in the existence of a natural order, a natural state of affairs which corresponds to the nature of things: of nature and man.” This “natural state of affairs” is reflected in the traditional morality found in almost every society, and people violate it at their peril. Prof. Hoppe argues that in a democratic welfare society, “most [people who call themselves] conservatives . . . do not recognize that their goal of restoring normalcy requires the most drastic, even revolutionary, antistatist social changes . . .” He says it is impossible to rehabilitate the family and traditional morality without abolishing the welfare state that undermines them. He singles out Patrick Buchanan in particular for the warning that, “combining cultural conservatism and welfare-statism is impossible, and hence, economic nonsense.” Any conservative who wants to restore sane values will have to overthrow or at least eviscerate the state, and is therefore a revolutionary rather than a conservative.
Prof. Hoppe argues very forcefully that the fatal flaw of classic liberalism was the failure to understand that no monopoly power to tax and compel can be satisfactorily contained, even with a written constitution. He points out that once a liberal has conceded the legitimacy of any kind of taxation, he is at the mercy of socialists who want to raise taxes. Any debate over higher taxes is reduced to an argument about costs and benefits rather than a debate about principle, and in a democracy demagogues always win those arguments.
Prof. Hoppe is prepared to tread even on holy ground: “the American Constitution must be recognized for what it is — an error.” This is because “contrary to the original liberal intent of safeguarding liberty and property, every minimal government has the inherent tendency to become a maximal government.” The history of the United States demonstrates this perfectly.
With what, then, should we replace government? Prof. Hoppe thinks private, competing insurance companies could protect against crime and invasion — the only really essential function of government — just as they do against natural disasters. He also thinks that in the absence of government, natural aristocrats would arise to arbitrate contract disputes between citizens. He suggests it might be well to abolish government even if nothing replaced it, noting that although their function is protection, governments in the 20th century caused the deaths of some 170 million people through war and massacre.
Prof. Hoppe is not optimistic government can be abolished soon — indeed, it is expanding relentlessly towards a global government that would be colossally repressive — yet he reminds us that “every government can be brought down by a mere change in public opinion, i.e., by the withdrawal of the public’s consent and cooperation.” He suggests that once a critical mass of opinion were achieved, a few cities might withdraw from the state and form libertarian, no-government societies whose success would prompt imitators.
Short of abolishing government, Prof. Hoppe sees secession and ever-smaller units of limited government as a next-best solution: “[S]ecession always involves the breaking away of smaller from larger populations. It is thus a vote against the principle of democracy and majoritarianism.” A variety of small states is always better than one big state, because any single wicked government action will affect fewer people. Also, where there is freedom of emigration, neighboring governments are in a kind of competition, since productive citizens will move out if there is too much taxation and coercion. Finally, in a big country like the United States, it is easy to loot fellow citizens because there are millions of them and they live far away. People in small communities who know each other hesitate to use the tax system to shake each other down.
It is a mistake, moreover, to assume that national wealth requires bigness. A tiny country can be wealthy so long as it is integrated into the world economy. Switzerland is far richer than Brazil, and Hong Kong (before the Chinese took it back) and Singapore are clear success stories.
Prof. Hoppe acknowledges that ignorance and stupidity are among the built-in obstacles to abolishing democratic government. Most people do not realize that anything the government gives them it first had to take from them or from someone else. Thus, only an elite will spearhead a movement to abolish or drastically curtail government. Prof. Hoppe quotes Wilhelm Röpke: “the ‘revolt of the masses’ must be countered by another revolt, the ‘revolt of the elite.’” Unfortunately, in the United States, “elites” are as likely to figure how best to get on the receiving end of transfer payments as to lead a movement to abolish them.
Jared Taylor and Paul Kersey note two milestones: the appointment of the first illegal immigrant to a California state-wide position and Britain’s refusal to admit the attractive, thoughtful trio of Brittany Pettibone, Lauren Southern, and Martin Sellner. They also discuss the possibility of fast-track visas for white South African farmers heading for Australia, the saga of the brilliant and courageous Amy Wax, the latest study on genes and IQ, and what went wrong with the black-themed version of A Wrinkle in Time.
Over the weekend of March 9-11, the activist organization Identity Evropa (IE) held its first national conference with the theme, “Leading our People Forward 2018.” The meeting brought together some 150 members in a beautiful location for what can only be called a resounding success.
IE is a membership-based group with chapters throughout the country. It has gained a high profile through its campaign of postering, primarily on college campuses, and through flash activism events modeled on Generation Identity’s highly successful work in Europe. There have been countless regional and local IE meetings, but this was the first time members gathered from all over the country.
It was my privilege to be asked, along with Sam Dickson, to address the meeting. The sense of excitement and camaraderie was palpable, start to finish. I met activists from Texas, Nevada, Virginia, Tennessee, California, the Dakotas, Michigan, Florida, Georgia, and many other states; only Alaska did not seem to be represented, and there were two comrades from Canada. IE is a selective organization that accepts only those candidates who meet strict criteria, and the result is a group of men and women who are smart, committed, sensible, and impressive in every way.
About half the program consisted of reports by chapter heads and other leaders, who described the communities they are building and the ambitious goals they have set for themselves. The other half was speeches by James Allsup, Sam Dickson, myself, and IE Executive Director Patrick Casey. Every report and talk was met with a standing ovation; the atmosphere was electric with enthusiasm and commitment.
On Sunday afternoon, some 50 members drove to the Parthenon in Centennial Park in Nashville, Tennessee, where they unfurled a 40-foot long banner reading “European Roots/American Greatness.” Members waved American and IE flags while Mr. Casey gave a short, impassioned speech. It was a dramatic and inspiring culmination of a weekend that, I believe, marks a turning point in the development of this very promising organization.
Videos of the talks, and extensive coverage of the banner drop will be available at the IE site very shortly. We look forward to hearing more exciting news from this organization soon.
Jared Taylor and Paul Kersey describe the looming battle between the federal government and the state of California over “sanctuary.” They also discuss prospects for gun rights in an increasingly non-white USA, new findings in the Air Force Academy race hoax, the Italian elections, contrasting British hate speech convictions, and the New York Times’ recognition that Donald Trump was right: Sweden has an immigration problem.
Jared Taylor interviews South African author and activist Dan Roodt about the implications of the recent parliamentary vote to confiscate white-owned farms. How have whites coped with the already oppressive system of “black economic empowerment” (BEE), and what future do whites have under increasingly militant black rule?
Jared Taylor and Paul Kersey discuss the origins of the PROMISE program that shielded the Florida shooter from arrest. The program, strongly promoted by the Obama administration, was to stop the “school to prison pipeline” simply by failing to arrest young criminals—because blacks and Hispanics were being collared at “unreasonable” rates. Taylor and Kersey also discuss buildings in Baltimore that “breed crime,” the Oakland mayor who acted like a “gang look-out” to protect illegals, the Kerner Commission redux, and how advances in trauma medicine are artificially reducing big-city homicide rates.
Jared Taylor and Paul Kersey laugh at how differently the mainstream media played two recent DNA-analysis stories: 10,000-year-old Cheddar Man reportedly had black skin, and the ancient Egyptians were more closely related to Europeans than to black Africans. Taylor and Kersey also discuss the new presidential portrait, alleged bias against non-whites in mortgage lending, the FBI’s surprisingly clear warning about the Chinese threat, and pending Delaware regulations that would let public school students choose both their sex and their race.
Kimani Paul-Emile is a light-skinned black woman who teaches law at Fordham Law School. Since graduating from Brown University in 1993 and getting a law degree from Georgetown, she has been showered with countless honors and fellowships, and in 2016, she co-founded the Center for Race, Law, and Justice at Fordham. “Just suing isn’t going to get you there,” she explained at the time, noting that “it requires a broader approach” to correct “the racial disparities and inequality that threaten our democracy and system of justice.”
Prof. Paul-Emile has been as good as her word. She has come up with a novel approach to correcting “racial disparities” that exemplifies the inexhaustible inventiveness of the leftist imagination. In a paper called “Blackness as Disability?” she proposes a radical expansion of the grounds on which minorities—but especially blacks—should get special treatment.
When the paper was first announced, only its abstract was available, and Breitbart and The College Fix mocked it as yet another example of fanciful academic lunacy. The full, 73-page paper is now available, and it is stuffed with legal citations and footnotes. This woman is serious: She is proposing a new way of treating race that would give blacks—and perhaps other non-whites—massive benefits. In a country that has managed to turn anti-discrimination laws such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 into justifications for discriminating against whites, it is entirely possible that a “progressive” administration would try to implement her proposal.
The very first lines of the article set out Prof. Paul-Emile’s perspective:
Is being black in the United States today a disability? This may seem a startling question, but it accurately reflects what black, as a racial designation, is and was designed to be: disabling. Racial categories were created explicitly to serve as a caste system to privilege some and disadvantage others. Within this system, racial minority status was devised to limit opportunity, participation, and achievement, and it continues to do so in many areas of social and economic life.
Prof. Paul-Emile concedes that blacks now have equal legal rights and that deliberate discrimination is rare and widely denounced, but insists that legal equality isn’t enough. It “failed to combat the predominant forms of discrimination that harm minority populations: unconscious bias, stereotyping, and structural inequality,” all of which work their harm “in the absence of intentional discrimination.” [emphasis added] White people may no longer want to keep black people down, but the racial “caste system” they built is so powerful it continues to oppress black people anyway.
This is now the standard leftist view. Outright “oppression” of blacks is impossible to find. There are no laws that directly disadvantage them. Even neutral laws that are said to have a disproportionate impact on them such as voter ID requirements or felon disfranchisement are struck down by judges. Despite endless talk of “institutional racism,” who can name a single institution with a structure that is inherently biased against blacks? In America today, oppression requires no oppressors and no mechanisms of oppression. It is proven—conclusively—from the mere fact of racial inequality.
This explains why Prof. Paul-Emile thinks the traditional legal approach to fighting discrimination does not work. It has two fatal limitations. First, it “focuses on malicious intent.” It is almost impossible to prove malicious intent because nearly all the oppression from which blacks suffer is unconscious; actual racists are vanishingly rare. The second limitation of anti-discrimination law is that it “promotes the impractical norm of colorblindness.” The US Supreme Court has taken the unreasonable position that if racial discrimination in favor whites was bad, racial discrimination in favor of blacks is bad, too. It has ruled that the obvious solutions to the problem of black oppression—special treatment for blacks—is legal only in very limited ways that pass “strict judicial scrutiny.” That is, they have to achieve a “compelling governmental interest” and they have to be “narrowly tailored” to further that goal. Outright race preferences rarely meet such a high standard.
Colorblindness may sound fair, but colorblindness is precisely the problem. Prof. Paul-Emile argues that the very idea of race is a false one that was concocted to hold black people down. Until we recognize this, colorblind solutions will fail: “By failing to acknowledge that racial classifications were designed to function as a caste system, the intent doctrine and colorblindness flatten racial difference, giving all distinctions a false equivalence.” By “false equivalence” she means that the Supreme Court fails to understand the moral difference between evil discrimination against blacks and necessary and legitimate discrimination in favor of blacks. As she notes, courts have even been so unreasonable as to disallow remedies that favor of blacks because they hurt whites.
Brutal racial inequalities therefore persist. What to do?
For Prof. Paul-Emile, the solution is “hiding in plain sight:” apply disability law instead of anti-discrimination law. Prof. Paul-Emile recognizes that this was not Congress’s intent. She suspects Congress passed protections for people with disabilities only because “progress in achieving equality and opportunity for marginalized populations has been limited to moments when the interests of white elites ‘converge’ with those of disadvantaged communities.” Self-centered white men passed laws to protect the disabled because they recognized “that any able-bodied person, themselves included, could at any time become physically or mentally disabled due to chance, age, illness, or accident. But these same legislators were likely quite certain that they would not become black if they were not so already,” so they refused to provide the same remedies for blackness.
However, Congress gave the President broad powers to interpret disability laws and “under a progressive executive branch, DOJ could construe the law to cover black people.” In other words, you could wake up one morning under a Kamela Harris administration and find that someone like Eric Holder had smuggled in broad preferences for blacks through the legal back door by designating blackness as a “disability.”
Laws such as the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) prohibit job discrimination against otherwise qualified people with disabilities that “substantially limit” their ability to perform “one or more of the major life activities.” An employer has to make “reasonable accommodation” so that the disabled person can do the job. Classic examples are putting in ramps and special toilet stalls for people in wheelchairs, or replacing warning buzzers with warning lights so that deaf people get the message.
Treating blackness as a disability would be huge boost for blacks. As Prof. Paul-Emile points out, with disability law, you almost never have to prove malicious intent, only that “even neutral actions, policies, and programs . . . institutions, and norms can ‘substantially limit’ a person’s ability to perform ‘one or more of the major life activities.’ ” Curbstones may seem neutral, but if they don’t have cuts in them, it’s hard for people in wheelchairs to cross the street. Disabled people don’t have to prove malice, only that uncut curbs limit a major life activity.
What’s more, disability law is very clear about something else: People without disabilities are forbidden to bring suit claiming that special treatment for the disabled discriminates against them. People who are legally blind get special tax deductions. People in wheelchairs get the best parking. If you can see and walk, and think this kind of special treatment discriminates against you, too bad. Likewise, if blackness were a disability that brought special treatment, white people would be barred from bringing suit on the basis of “reverse discrimination.”
Prof. Paul-Emile notes that “the principle that equality sometimes necessitates treating people differently has generated much rancor in the context of affirmative action.” She entirely accepts the principle of treating people—especially blacks—differently in order to treat them equally, and moving remedies to the realm of disability law would make them legally unassailable.
A recognized disability is a condition. If you have it, you benefit, and no one else can do anything about it. That is the status Prof. Paul-Emile wants for blacks.
We think of a disability as a physical or medical condition. Some examples recognized by law are missing limbs, autism, cancer, cerebral palsy, diabetes, epilepsy, multiple sclerosis, muscular dystrophy, depression, bipolar disorder, post-traumatic stress syndrome, obsessive compulsive disorder, and schizophrenia. Prof. Paul-Emile explains how blackness fits in:
Disability law recognizes that many conditions understood as disabling do not necessarily arise from a medical condition, but are instead traits that create disadvantage when combined with an inhospitable social or physical environment. . . .
Blackness becomes disabling once situated within particular social contexts. . . .
[S]ome conditions that we consider disabling are not inherent impairments, but are instead just traits that, when coupled with an unwelcoming social setting, can create disadvantage. Disability laws are not concerned about whether this process occurred intentionally or consciously, only that it disables certain individuals . . . .
In Prof. Paul-Emile’s view, being black is not, of course, a defect; it becomes a disability only in a “white supremacist” environment. And she has no trouble proving to her own satisfaction that blackness limits the ability of black people to perform “one or more of the major life activities,” as the law requires for a condition to be a disability. She cites the usual statistics on incarceration, poverty, and drug arrests, as well as studies purporting to show that racism gives black people low birth weight and chronic pain, makes them fat, shortens their lives, and gives them high infant mortality rates. This is all due to the relentless racism that relegates blacks to bad schools, polluted neighborhoods, poverty, jail, etc. Every difference in achievement between blacks and whites is due to the racism, white supremacy, and oppression that went into creating the “racial caste system” designed to hold blacks down.
The concept of disability law puts all this in clear focus: “In the same way that society was developed by and for the non-disabled, so too has it been structured in a way that privileges Whites, who have a competitive advantage in an unequal playing field on which Blacks struggle to compete.” Disability law points the way to a solution: “[I]t provides a mechanism for identifying the ways in which social institutions, policies, and norms have been shaped—consciously or unconsciously—in a way that benefits one racial group at the expense of another.”
How would applying the concept of disability work in practice? Here Prof. Paul-Emile shows astonishing lack of imagination. She wants black schools to be brought up to the standard of white schools, and black students to be put into gifted programs as often as they actually deserve. She also wants police racial profiling—already illegal—stopped. This would mean an end to “stop and frisk.” For someone who claims that “the blackness-as-disability framework holds tremendous promise for rethinking racial inequality across many sectors of society,” this is uninspiring.
I can do better. To begin with, we should bring back race norming. It was used with brilliant effect on a standardized test called the General Aptitude Test Battery (GATB). This was a reliable test that had been used since 1947 to evaluate candidates for a broad variety of jobs. Like all valid tests, whites got better scores than blacks, which was embarrassing. So in 1981, the US Department of Labor solved the problem.
If a black, a Hispanic, a white, and an Asian each got the same GATB raw score of 300, their reported scores went through a process called “ethnic adjustment.” The black would be ranked in the 87th percentile, the Hispanic in the 74th, and the white and Asian together at the bottom in the 47th percentile. The test could then be used to give the job to the black. He was, after all, in the 87th percentile for blacks, and was therefore a much better candidate—after race norming—than the white who got the same score but was only in the 47th percentile for whites. For a white to be considered the better candidate, he would have to be in at least the 87th percentile for whites and get a much higher raw score than the black.
By 1986, about 40 state governments and hundreds of private companies were race norming the GATB, but they kept it a secret from the estimated 16 million people who took the test. Companies that hired through state employment agencies often got race-normed candidate profiles without knowing it.
Congress got wind of what was going on and banned race norming in 1991, but it is an obvious solution to black disability. All tests, whether for drivers licenses, the bar, AP classes, hair dressers’ licenses, or the SAT should be race normed. After all, race differences in scores are the result of white supremacist oppression and do not reflect actual differences in ability; nor are they the result of malicious intent by people giving the test. Race norming would be a dramatic but obvious remedy to the persistent, unintended structural inequality Prof. Paul-Emile wants to correct.
There are other quantitative remedies. It is well known that blacks have an average IQ of 85 compared to a white average of 100, but this difference is a measure of structural inequality, not ability. This false indicator of intelligence ranks the average black at the 16th percentile of white ability. For virtually every job in every profession, black workers—especially those hired according to race-normed criteria—should get full marks for performing at the 16th percentile of job performance for whites. This would be “reasonable accommodation” to the disability from which blacks suffer.
Other measures could be taken that whites could not oppose in the name of “reverse discrimination.” Structural bias in the criminal justice system could be reduced if black defendants always had black, court-appointed counsel, were tried only before black judges, and had juries that were at least 50 percent black. Perhaps all municipal police chiefs could be black. Media could be cured of unconscious bias if at least 13 percent of writers, editors, and producers were black. All companies over a market capitalization of, say, $100 million could be required to have a certain number of black board members. All non-profit corporations could be required to show how their tax-exempt status benefits blacks.
There could be financial remedies. Prof. Paul-Emile writes that American society has “been structured in a way that privileges Whites, who have a competitive advantage in an unequal playing field on which Blacks struggle to compete.” What more straightforward way to level the playing field than to impose sales taxes or property taxes, for example, only on whites, or to require whites to pay a supplemental “privilege tax” over and above their income tax liability?
Surely Prof. Paul-Emile and her colleagues can think of more remedies, and surely Supreme Court Justices such as Sonia Sotomayor and Elena Kagan would find them all constitutional.
As I see it, the only disadvantage in applying disability law to the problem of blackness is the word “disability.” Eventually the word might lose its aroma of inferiority, but for now, this field of law should be renamed “compensatory law.” This removes stigma and restores the aura of justice that best suits the law.
Of course, this is all nonsense, but it flows logically and even inevitably from the great factual void at the heart of Prof. Paul-Emile’s view of the world: the assumption that blacks and whites are precisely equal and that whites must heal themselves and their society in order to eliminate all race differences in achievement. If whites let themselves fall into permanent minority status, this view—already dominant—will be used to justify ever more draconian transfers of wealth from whites to blacks.
Earlier, I expressed surprise that Prof. Paul-Emile’s proposals for actually applying disability law were so modest. Maybe she just doesn’t want to show her hand. All my proposals are entirely consistent with her reasoning. Like the immigration reform of 1965 that promised not to change the ethnic balance but that is reducing whites to a minority, and like anti-discrimination laws that legalized discrimination against whites, “black disability” would be sold as something it is not: as part of the arsenal of justice rather than as yet another way to dispossess whites.
Jared Taylor and Paul Kersey analyze Donald Trump’s first State of the Union address and—more significantly—the revealing ways in which the Democrats and the Black Congressional Caucus reacted to it. They also report on bits of sanity that are beginning to infiltrate mainstream reporting on urban decay and black crime, and speculate that the easy availability of alternative voices—such as theirs—mean that big media can no longer pretend that genes don’t matter. Taylor and Kersey also discuss Michael Moore’s latest outbursts, the comedic lawsuit Gloria Allred brought against Walmart, and Los Angeles’s sad collapse into diversity.
Jared Taylor and Paul Kersey talk about the effect the newly-released photo of Barack Obama with Louis Farrakhan could have had on his run for the presidency, and recall some of Jeremiah Wright’s choice words. They also talk about the replacement in Baltimore of Lee and Jackson with Harriet Tubman, the new concept of blackness as a “disability,” the latest pathetic manifestation of “Stockholm Syndrome,” multi-culti additions to the PISA test, and Trump’s long-overdue campaign to deport high-profile illegals.
Jared Taylor and Paul Kersey explain the implications of California’s new self-designation as a “sanctuary state.” Will Jeff Sessions have the spine to arrest local officials who violate federal law? Mr. Taylor and Mr. Kersey also talk about a black St. Louis official who has been spanked for truth-telling, a new estimate from Yale that there could be as many as 23 million illegals, the implications of “Blaxit,” and signs of race-realism sneaking into the upcoming general elections in Italy.
Jared Taylor and Paul Kersey explain how the Obama administration used “temporary protected status” to grant de facto amnesty to illegal immigrants from “s**thole” countries. Donald Trump is withdrawing that status and sending home Haitians and Salvadorans. Trump is also enforcing other regulations to speed up deportation. Taylor and Kersey also praise Victor Orban’s strong statements on migrants, and laugh at Mayor De Blasio’s attempts to sanitize “offensive” public monuments in New York City.
Jared Taylor and Paul Kersey discuss the racial implications of the new Disney/Marvel movie The Black Panther. They also describe the astonishing lengths to which white men are being kept out of design and construction of the Obama presidential library, the Israeli policy to expel African “infiltrators,” and the disturbing implications of Germany’s new anti-free-speech laws.
Arthur R. Jensen, The g Factor, Praeger Publishers, 1998, 648 pp., ISBN: 0275961036, $39.95
Arthur Jensen of U.C. Berkeley is one of the greatest social scientists of our time. He virtually single-handedly resurrected the scientific study of intelligence, and he has been at the center of many breakthroughs in this field. Needless to say, he is a courageous man, who has never let hysterical opposition or even death threats keep him from studying some of the most important and contentious issues we face.
The g Factor is only the latest of the many publications that resulted from what can now be seen as a watershed event: the 1969 appearance in the Harvard Educational Review of Prof. Jensen’s famous article on the heritability of IQ and how difficult it is to raise. This article not only reestablished the connection between genetics and intelligence but set the direction of Prof. Jensen’s career. He has since written countless articles in this field and three major books: Educability and Group Differences (1973), Bias in Mental Testing (1980), and now, The g Factor.
These books chart the recent remarkable progress in the study of intelligence. If Prof. Jensen had so dominated any less controversial field he would certainly be a candidate for the Nobel Prize. Unfortunately, his real stature is recognized only by a small number of specialists and professional colleagues, but the implications of his work continue to reverberate through the larger society. Whatever recognition he may ultimately receive, his work has gone far to set the study of mental ability once more on a firmly scientific basis.
The g Factor
This book is an investigation of the nature of intelligence, the extent to which it is under genetic control, and its uneven distribution between individuals and groups. The first part is a complete and sometimes technical treatment of “the g factor” itself, which appears to be a unitary mental ability underlying all activities we think of as requiring intelligence. “Factors” are the end result of a mathematical procedure called factor analysis, and the g factor is the “general” factor of intelligence, first hypothesized by the British psychologist, Charles Spearman (1863-1945). Spearman thought of g as a direct analogy to the “G” of physics, that is Newton’s gravitational constant. Spearman’s view, substantiated by almost a century of research, was that g is of central importance to psychology just as g was to Newtonian physics.
G can be thought of as the undifferentiated raw cognitive power of the brain. It cannot be directly measured, but it manifests itself in all types of cognitive activity, and people who are good at one kind of mental test tend to be good at all of them. To use the statistical term, a person’s different abilities are correlated, and similar abilities tend to correlate most closely with each other. For example, someone who is exceptionally good at any mathematical test is likely to be very good at all mathematical tests — but he is likely to perform well on verbal tests, too. As we will see, g is at work when even the smallest demands are made on the mind.
If people take enough different kinds of mental tests, their scores can be analyzed for factors, or the tendency of the correlations between similar abilities to cluster in groups. There will be factors for such things as verbal, musical, mathematical, and spatial manipulation abilities. Further analysis of these factors reveals a fundamental factor common to them all, which is the g factor.
We can therefore imagine a series of different factories in the brain, all powered by the same energy source. One of the factories manufactures solutions to mathematical problems, while another produces correct understandings of words and sentences. Other factories produce solutions to other kinds of mental problems, but all of them can be thought of as running off a common power source, which is g.
People differ in the efficiency of their individual factories, which is why smart people have different strengths in different areas despite being smart in a general sort of way. But people differ most significantly in the level of the general power source, or g. Someone with an IQ of 100 may have a math factory that is relatively more efficient than his verbal or music factory, but even in math he is likely to fall well behind someone with an IQ of 130 whose math factory is relatively less efficient than his verbal factory. It is the difference in levels of power available to all of a person’s factories that produce the marked differences in ability that characterize our species.
Many kinds of mental performance can be taught and people can show improvement, but what is improving is an ability that is not g. As Prof. Jensen explains, “At the level of psychometrics [mental testing], ideally, g may be thought of as a distillate of the common source of individual differences in all mental tests, completely stripped of their distinctive features, of information content, skill, strategy, and the like.”
Interestingly, Prof. Jensen reports that it is at the highest levels of g that people show the most variation in abilities that are independent of g. Thus, very intelligent people may have markedly different mental ability profiles despite similar levels of g. If all the factories are getting lots of power from their common source, some of the factories are likely to be unusually efficient so that the pattern of different levels of efficiency can differ considerably from one smart person to another.
Some critics have complained that g is not real because it cannot be measured directly and must be derived by a complex statistical process. Prof. Jensen shows that it is not, for this reason, artificial. If there were no g factor, sophisticated mathematics could not coax it into existence. Moreover, the same g factor is found in all human populations, and can be derived from the results of mental tests prepared by people who have never heard of g or who have even doubted there was such a factor. g can be calculated only because it exists, and in that sense is purely objective. Prof. Jensen believes that it reflects one of the basic functions of the brain, and that although all normal people share the same biological structures they differ greatly in the efficiency of certain neurological processes.
Direct assessment of brain functions gives strong evidence that g is a real, physiological phenomenon, and Prof. Jensen has been a pioneer in using what are called elementary cognitive tasks (ECTs) to study intelligence. The simplest sort of ECT involves a test device with two push-buttons (see illustration, below). The subject holds down the black button while he waits for a light to go on inside the smaller, white button. He then presses the illuminated button as quickly as possible. This measures two things. The first is reaction time: the time between the light going on and the subject taking his finger off the black button. The second is movement time: the time it takes the subject to move his finger from the black button to the illuminated button.
Obviously, this is a very simple (indeed, elementary) task, though tests of this kind can be made more complicated. For example, there can be a number of smaller buttons that can light up in different patterns, requiring the subject to make slightly more complicated decisions before moving his finger. We do not think of this sort of thing as mentally demanding — no one ever “fails” these tests — but the neurological processing that goes into these very simple tasks is closely related to intelligence.
Prof. Jensen has found that reaction speed is strongly correlated with g level, but that the highest correlation is between g and consistency of reaction time. With a set of scores from various different ECTs, it is possible to achieve a 0.7 correlation with g as calculated from conventional IQ tests. This approaches the g correlation (0.8) of Ravens Progressive Matrices, the IQ test that comes the closest to measuring g itself. Surprising as it may seem, careful monitoring of the processes that underlie ECTs can give results that are so reliable they rival pencil-and-paper tests.
ECT performance matches group differences in intelligence. It is worse in children than in adults, and better in gifted children than in normal children. Blacks have quicker movement times than whites while whites have quicker and more consistent reaction times. Asians do slightly better than whites, and performance for no group improves with practice; ECTs appear to measure something basic to the brain.
Another direct assessment of mental processing is the inspection time test. This uses an instrument called a tachistoscope to throw an image on a screen for a very brief period. Starting at the millisecond level, which is too quick for anyone to see the image, the exposure is gradually increased until a subject can just make it out. There is a correlation of .54 between speed of inspection time and IQ — remarkably high for a task that is so different from an IQ test. Once again, the test seems to be measuring a neurological process closely associated with mental processing.
Yet another direct assessment is the study of brain waves. Prof. Jensen explains that a wave pattern called average evoked potential can be analyzed in specialized ways that show a surprisingly high correlation with IQ.
Finally, researchers have devised something that is essentially a direct test of brain efficiency. The brain’s fuel is glucose, or simple sugar. When a radioactive isotope of glucose is injected into a subject’s blood stream it is possible to measure the rate at which the brain takes it up and metabolizes it. When rate of metabolism is measured while subjects are taking an IQ test, the high scorers use less sugar than the low scorers, with a remarkable correlation with IQ of around .7 or .8. The less powerful brains get wrong answers despite burning more fuel. If we return to the analogy of the brain as composed of factories, the common power supply simply appears to be less efficient.
If advances continue to be made in direct assessment of the brain, conventional IQ testing may be superseded. This would certainly silence any complaints about “test bias.”
Because the issue of whether education or environment can influence IQ levels is central to so much policy-making, The g Factor thoroughly covers the question of heritability. Kinship and adoption studies have provided some of the most illuminating data on this question, and Prof. Jensen reports them in detail.
Some of the most significant findings are the correlations of IQs of identical twins reared in the same family (.86), identical twins separated at birth and reared in different families (.75) and fraternal twins reared in the same family (.60). That identical twins separated at birth should have more similar IQs than fraternal twins reared by the same parents is perhaps the single most powerful argument for the view that genes have a greater effect on IQ than environment. As Prof. Jensen points out, “similarities in the MZA’s [monozygotic (identical) twins reared apart] environments cannot possibly account for more than a minute fraction of the IQ correlation of +.75 between MZAs.”
Studies of siblings and adopted children likewise confirm the power of heredity in determining differences in IQ, and it is now generally agreed among specialists that 60 to 80 percent of human IQ variation is due to genes. This does not mean, however, that the remaining environmental influences are well understood or can be used to raise IQ. As Prof. Jensen explains, “a large part of the specific environmental variance appears to be due to the additive effects of a large number of more or less random and largely physical events — developmental ‘noise’ — with small, but variable positive and negative influences on the neurophysiological substrate of mental growth.”
What is this developmental “noise”? “[S]uch effects as childhood diseases, traumas, and the like, as well as prenatal effects such as mother-fetus incompatibility of blood antigens, maternal health, and perinatal effects of anoxia and other complications in the birth process, could each have a small adverse effect on mental development.” These appear to be the kind of non-genetic factors that influence IQ, and they are not the sort of thing that can be easily manipulated.
As Prof. Jensen makes emphatically clear, the non-genetic influence comes only slightly, if at all, from what are called between-family differences: education of parents, social status, family income, school quality, etc. Liberals believe that these are the crucial factors that make people different from each other, but liberals are wrong. IQ (like other personality traits) is astonishingly impervious to any but the most degraded and unfavorable environments.
Prof. Jensen calls the environmentalist view “the sociologist’s fallacy.” It is true that children from wealthy homes tend to be smarter than children from poor homes, but wealth does not make them smart. They get genes for intelligence from their smart parents, and their parents are likely to be well off (and have homes full of books and speak in complete sentences) because they are smart. Of course, children do differ from their parents in intelligence, and these differences explain how families rise and fall. A person’s IQ has a correlation of .7 with his own adult socio-economic status but only about .4 with that of his parents.
Error though it be, the sociologist’s fallacy has driven not only an enormous number of government uplift programs but several well-publicized private efforts to raise the IQs of poor black children. Prof. Jensen reviews the results of the Milwaukee Project, Head Start, and the Abecedarian Project, some of which made extraordinary attempts to improve environments.
In some cases, the early results were very encouraging: gains of 20 or even 30 points compared to control groups. But as Prof. Jensen convincingly argues, what the children learned at intensive “infant stimulation centers” and the like was information and strategies that helped them take the tests. g very probably did not change. In most cases, administrators did not give a battery of tests and attempt to calculate g. Instead, they gave the same test at different ages and rejoiced to find improvement.
Professor Jensen gives a striking example of how training can improve test results without raising g. He notes many children’s IQ tests have a memory component: How long a string of letters or numbers can the child repeat back to the tester? Most adults can’t remember more than about seven numbers, but with lots of practice and training, people can remember as many as 70 or even 100 digits. They can do this because they develop a specific strategy or skill, not because their memory or g level has improved. The tricks a person uses to remember 70 digits are so specialized, in fact, that they do not even help the same person remember more than an average number of letters (rather than digits)!
Children who took part in these widely-acclaimed IQ-raising programs probably learned specific skills of this kind during the thousands of hours of instruction they received. But even the most intensive enrichment programs had virtually no permanent effect on school performance or IQ, which suggests that g itself was unchanged. Prof. Jensen concludes that IQ cannot be appreciably increased by specialized education.
It is true that the IQ test scores of children are affected to some degree by the environment their parents make for them. This is almost certainly because they learn more facts and absorb test-taking strategies and not because the love and care of good parents improves g. In fact, as children grow older they create environments that suit their own genetic endowments, and Prof. Jensen is categorical about what then happens: “By adulthood, all of the IQ correlation between biologically related persons is genetic . . . [T]he environmental contribution to the familial correlations is nil.” Surprising as it may seem, once a child grows up, his IQ score is similar to that of family members only because he is genetically related to them, not because they spent many years in the same household.
Prof. Jensen is equally forthright in explaining that genes account for the well-established IQ differences between the races. First, he points out that approximately half — or 50,000 — of the genes that vary in human beings play a role in brain functions, and that 30,000 affect the brain exclusively. It would be astonishing if genes did not play a central role in intelligence and if the races, which differ physically in so many ways, did not differ in brain function.
He also offers an arresting refutation of the fashionable view that race is purely a social construct and is not biological. Prof. Jensen likens race to the visible colors. A rainbow forms when the wave-length of light changes continuously and uniformly, but we do not perceive a continuous change. Instead, we see distinct bands of color. Though there may be some blurring of race at the edges because of cross mating, races are as distinct as the bands of visible color. Prof. Jensen also cites the increasingly persuasive genetic evidence for the biological distinctness of different populations (see figure, below).
A number of elegant demonstrations based on the principle of regression toward the mean strongly suggest a genetic origin for group differences. This principle is a biological law according to which parents who are at the extremes of any trait are likely to have children who are less extreme. Two very tall parents are likely to have children who are not quite so tall, and two very short parents are likely to have children who are not quite so short. In the children, these traits revert toward the average, or the mean. The same effect is found in intelligence, but the mean toward which the black IQ regresses is a full 15 points lower than the white mean.
Therefore, when black couples and white couples are matched for IQ, the black/white IQ difference in their children increases as parental IQ increases. In other words, high IQ is an anomaly in all races, but more of an anomaly for blacks than for whites, and the children of high-IQ blacks regress further because they are regressing toward a lower mean.
Prof. Jensen reports a study of high-IQ children in one school district that provides more evidence for the difference in means. When white and black students were perfectly matched for IQs of 120, the average IQs of the siblings of the whites was 113 whereas the average IQs for the siblings of the blacks was 99. Among blacks, an IQ of 120 is simply a much greater deviation from the norm than it is for whites, and this is reflected in the IQs of their more ordinary siblings.
Regression toward the mean explains something that has always baffled the “sociologists:” children of low-income whites (and Asians) get better SAT scores than the children of high-income blacks. If environment controls IQ, the children of wealthy blacks should be enjoying the benefits of good environment. They are, but those benefits are meager and do not make up for the effects of heredity and the lower mean toward which black children regress.
There is no non-genetic explanation for group differences that can account for phenomena of this kind, but they are perfectly consistent with widely accepted principles of genetics. Specialists understand the force of arguments of this kind, which is why the view that “racism” and other environmental factors cause the black/white IQ gap persists mostly among the ignorant — who are the great majority.
More strong evidence for a substantially different biological mean for IQ is found in studies of the low end of the IQ distribution curve as well. Mental retardation — IQs below 70 — is generally of two types, familial and organic. Familial retardation occurs in children who are otherwise normal but were simply dealt a very poor hand of the genes that affect intelligence. Given a normal distribution of intelligence, a few people are inevitably going to have very low IQs, just as a few will have very high ones. Organic retardation, on the other hand, is caused by clear biological defects, like Down’s syndrome (Mongolism) and children who suffer from it are obviously abnormal.
An important racial difference lies in the fact that half of whites with IQs below 70 are organic retardates but only 12.5 percent of the blacks are. The source of this difference is the racial disparity in naturally occurring distributions of intelligence. Given that the distribution curve for black intelligence is shifted approximately 15 points toward the left, a substantially larger proportion of otherwise normal blacks will fall below an IQ of 70.
The opposite is true at the high end of the curve. The percentage of whites with IQs higher than 130 is 20 times that of blacks. Because there are approximately six times as many whites as blacks in America, in real terms there are perhaps 120 times more whites than blacks with IQs at this level. This is why, without racial preferences, it is impossible to admit large numbers of blacks to competitive universities or to promote them to challenging positions.
Brain and head size studies likewise confirm the biological origins of group differences. It is now well established that brain size correlates with intelligence, and Prof. Jensen reports that the heads of black newborns are a full .4 standard deviation smaller than those of whites.
Likewise, it has long been known that near-sightedness, or myopia, is correlated with intelligence; children with IQs over 130 are three to five times more likely to be nearsighted than children with normal IQs. There seems to be no functional, cause-and-effect connection between myopia and intelligence, but a pleiotropic relationship exists in that some of the same genes affect both traits. Intelligence and myopia are somehow “side effects” of each other to some degree. Prof. Jensen finds that myopia is most common in Jews, next in Asians, then in whites, and least common in blacks — precisely the distribution one would expect. Moreover, reading does not cause myopia. An oculist can examine the eyes of children who are too young to read and who are not yet near-sighted, and accurately predict whether they will need glasses later in life.
It is well known that the test score gap between blacks and whites varies from one IQ test to another, and that the gap narrows on the least abstract, most information-laden tests. Prof. Jensen explains that the real difference lies in the extent to which a test measures g; the more g-“loaded” a test is and the fewer specific non-g abilities it measures, the greater the black/white gap.
Like many others who have studied the question, Prof. Jensen finds that the racial gap in IQ is increasing because of dysgenic birth patterns. In both races, less intelligent mothers are having more children than more intelligent mothers, but the disproportions are higher among blacks than whites. Also, since blacks have children, on average, two years earlier than whites, the generation time for blacks is shorter and dysgenic effects spread more rapidly.
One of Prof. Jensen’s most interesting racial findings is that the average IQ difference for blacks and whites in the same social class is 12 points — almost as great as the average difference between the two races (there is an average 17-point difference between any two people in the population picked at random). This is explained not only by preferential policies but also by racial differences in IQ distribution. If, for example, a demanding profession requires a minimum IQ of 125, blacks in that profession will tend to have IQs that cluster at the minimum, whereas whites will show greater variety. Because of this effect, the IQ gap between blacks and whites in the same social class narrows as one moves down the social scale.
Prof. Jensen finds that the geographic distribution of IQ is also uneven. For both blacks and whites, there is a continuous gradient that rises from the south towards the north and west. The gradient is sharper for blacks than whites, and both gradients are apparent in pre-school children, so regional differences in education do not explain it.
It has been widely reported that from infancy black children develop motor skills more rapidly than whites. Interestingly, Prof. Jensen finds that lower-class children (both white and black) develop more quickly than upper-class children, which suggests that slow maturation and high intelligence are correlated not just between races but within races.
For the most part, Prof. Jensen does not make policy recommendations; the facts alone are persuasive enough. He does point out, though, that life itself is a kind of continuous intelligence test, and that high g is one of the most important ingredients of success. He explains that scores on a highly g-loaded test are the best indicators of performance on any but the most specialized jobs. IQ is an excellent predictor for performance even on jobs that require manual dexterity and coordination. To a remarkable degree, g is the central mental characteristic of humans. Of course, intelligence is not everything. It takes more than brains to become a doctor — it takes persistence and discipline, too — but persistence is not enough. For many things, a certain level of g is indispensable, and low g cuts off desirable options at every stage of life. Low g is therefore a more accurate predictor of achievement than high g, since a lack of intelligence cannot usually be made up for by other qualities whereas high intelligence can be wasted.
When people with low g are scattered through otherwise normal communities it affects only individuals. Friends and relatives step in to help them. However, as Prof. Jensen points out, when people of low intelligence gather in large numbers, as they do in welfare housing, society falls apart. Prof. Jensen notes that in America there are now entire apartment blocks in which, even with welfare, the residents cannot get by without help from social workers. Dysgenic trends and increased immigration of low-g stock mean areas like this will only expand.
In this connection, Prof. Jensen makes some interesting observations about adult illiteracy. Most people assume that the cause is poor schooling, but he argues that the problem is usually not the process of decoding written language but understanding it. Most illiterates do no better on reading comprehension tests when the selections are read to them than when they try to do the reading themselves! Illiteracy, in Prof. Jensen’s view, is much more a problem of low g than of somehow not learning how to read.
There are a few points on which Prof. Jensen’s data differ from results AR has reported elsewhere. Some researchers have found that although the average IQs of men and women are the same, a greater standard deviation for men means that more of them are bunched at both high and low IQs. Prof. Jensen does not find sufficient evidence to draw this conclusion. He does confirm the standard sex differences in verbal and spatial abilities and even reports that some higher mammals show the typical male superiority in spatial ability. He also writes that in addition to their well-known advantage in verbal ability, one of the largest sex differences favoring women is in something called “speed and accuracy,” which is similar to clerical checking.
Prof. Jensen also takes up the question of why black women are so much more successful than black men. They are more likely to graduate from high school and college, pass high-level civil service tests, and enter skilled professions. This difference is not found among whites, and some researchers have wondered if black women may have a higher average IQ than black men. Once again, Prof. Jensen finds no such difference — but he offers no other explanation.
Prof. Jensen also differs from researchers who explain part of the black/white crime rate difference in terms of high black testosterone levels and an inability to defer gratification. He argues that population differences in g alone explain differences in crime rates. He notes that criminals of all races have IQs that are some 10 points below those of their siblings, and finds that within the same ranges of IQ, blacks and whites have essentially the same crime rates.
More than Generous
Needless to say, Prof. Jensen has spent his career disagreeing with others, and from time to time in The g Factor he must explain why his critics are wrong — and he is always a gentleman. Even with those who have disagreed with him in strong terms, he is more than generous in pointing out the parts of their theories that may be correct, and couches his own criticism in the gentlest terms. He treats his wildest, least scientific critics to nothing more than dignified silence: The names of Leon Kamin and Stephen Jay Gould do not even appear in an otherwise exhaustively researched and footnoted work.
The g Factor is not an easy book to read. Prof. Jensen writes clearly and repeats explanations when it would be unreasonable to expect perfect recall in his readers, but he writes for an informed, even specialist audience. He has already begun collaboration with a journalist on a more popular version of The g Factor. But those who are willing to invest the effort this book requires, will find that it is the monumental work of an extraordinary mind. A review can only begin to touch on its breadth and detail. This book is likely to become one of the landmark works in psychology, and it is the great good fortune of our society that a man of Prof. Jensen’s stature has made his career in this crucially important but thankless field.
Patrick J. Buchanan, State of Emergency: The Third World Invasion and Conquest of America, Thomas Dunne Books, 2006, 107 pp.
This marvelous book appears at exactly the right moment: just as Congress is returning from vacation to resume debate on comprehensive immigration control. Patrick Buchanan, who has already written nearly a whole shelf of conservative classics, is topping the best-seller lists with one of the most eloquent and influential calls for immigration control we are likely to see for many years. One of the rare public intellectuals who can look past economic arguments to the ties of blood and heritage that make a nation out of a rabble, Mr. Buchanan knows that the demographic transformation we are witnessing threatens the very survival of the country he loves. This book is a cry from the heart of a deeply committed American patriot.
Mr. Buchanan covers just about everything that has gone wrong: government failure to protect our borders or punish companies that hire illegals, the crushing burden of medicine and education for immigrants, the abandonment by elites of the concept of nation, the indifference and even hatred of many newcomers for America, the lust for reconquista, and the loss of will that means we must adapt to immigrants rather than the reverse. But most remarkably, Mr. Buchanan does not shy away from race.
He takes deliberate aim at people like Ben Wattenberg who tell us that anyone can be an American because we are a “creedal” or “proposition” nation. “Language, faith, culture, and history — and, yes, birth, blood, and soil — produce a people, not an ideology,” he writes. Elsewhere, he scoffs at the diversity we are supposed to be celebrating: “Nowhere on this earth can one find a multicultural, multiethnic, multilingual nation that is not at risk.”
Mr. Buchanan even quotes approvingly the late Sam Francis’s words at the 1994 AR conference: “The civilization that we as whites created in Europe and America could not have developed apart from the genetic endowments of the creating people, nor is there any reason to believe that the civilization can be successfully transmitted to a different people.” He points out that if Francis had said this about the Chinese, for example, no one would have been shocked, but to speak of the genetic endowments of Europeans is a hanging offense: Francis lost his job at the Washington Times.
Mr. Buchanan even puts in a good word for the people who passed the 1924 “national origins” restrictions on immigration: “We may call them bigoted, but they preserved the America we are losing.” Although at the time he supported the 1965 Celler-Hart bill that led to the current Third-World invasion, Mr. Buchanan now understands why Senator Sam Ervin of North Carolina opposed it. “What is wrong with the national origins of the American people?” the senator asked. “What is wrong with maintaining them? What is wrong with preferring as immigrants one’s own kinsmen?”
This book is undoubtedly the strongest defense of an essentially European America now available from a mainstream publisher.
Much of the data and most of the arguments in this book will be known to readers of AR, but State of Emergency ventures into less well known territory as well. In a brief account of the history of US immigration policy, Mr. Buchanan points out that the Statue of Liberty was first publicly linked to immigration in a speech by Franklin Roosevelt in 1936 — on the 50th anniversary of its dedication. Ironically, this was at a time when the US was receiving hardly any immigrants. As Mr. Buchanan explains, people who would have us believe we are a “creedal” nation are always trying to hijack America’s past; they tell us the statue always meant immigration.
Mr. Buchanan also gives us a review of our stormy relations with Mexico, laying to rest the idea that Mexico has never willingly given up territory. He points out the Mexicans once offered to sell us Baja California for $10 million but Congress rejected the offer.
Mr. Buchanan has a knack for marshalling familiar numbers in interesting ways. He points out, for example, that the figure of 36 million for immigrants and their children living in the United States is almost as large as the entire number of immigrants who came between 1607 and the Kennedy election of 1960. And today’s newcomers, he adds, are people who “have never been assimilated fully into any Western country.”
Likewise, if we accept the figure of 12 to 20 million illegals in our country, this is more than all the German and Italians who ever came here — and they were the most numerous immigrant peoples until everything changed in 1965.
In another interesting juxtaposition of figures, he notes that during the 1990s, the Hispanic population of LA County increased 27 percent — and the poverty rate increased 28 percent. During the same period the white population fell by 18 percent.
We are told over and over that illegals are essential to our economy, but Mr. Buchanan points out that they do not dominate a single profession. Illegals are most numerous as drywall/ceiling installers (27 percent) and landscape workers (26 percent), and their share of every other trade is even less.
State of Emergency includes a good account of deliberate Mexican efforts to fill our country with Mexicans and keep them loyal to the motherland. One of the most blatant operators has been Juan Hernandez, a former University of Texas professor whom Vicente Fox picked to run his Presidential Council for Mexicans Abroad. Mr. Hernandez, a dual citizen but loyal Mexican, told ABC’s Nightline how Mexican-Americans must think: “I want the third generation, the seventh generation, I want them all to think ‘Mexico first.’”
How did we sink so low? Mr. Buchanan writes that “there has arisen among our intellectual and cultural elites a contempt for the West,” and that our rulers worship at the “Church of GDP,” which believes in nothing but economic growth. Business wants an endless stream of cheap labor, and nanny-state bureaucrats want endless queues of clients for their handout programs.
Some kinds of support for immigration come close to certifiable insanity. As Mr. Buchanan explains, Republicans can never hope to win much Hispanic support because “there is an irreconcilable conflict between being a conservative party and being a party of Hispanics.” George W. Bush’s Mexico-boosting means that “today’s champion of open borders is a president whose own party is mortally imperiled by open borders.” Mr. Buchanan notes that in healthier times, our president’s failure to guard the border would have brought articles of impeachment.
There is considerable space in State of Emergency devoted to Europe, which is facing exactly the same crisis with exactly the same cowardice and willful blindness. Mr. Buchanan mentions an event in France that took place shortly after the attacks of Sept. 11, and went largely unrecorded in the United States. On Oct. 6, 2001, a much-heralded match took place between the French and Algerian national soccer teams — the first since Algeria won independence from France in 1962. Arranged as a sign of friendship and reconciliation, the game was held in the French national stadium, Stade de France, just outside Paris. Prime Minister Lionel Jospin was in the presidential box, along with half a dozen other ministers.
Things got off to a bad start when the French-Algerians in the stands — almost all of them French citizens — set up a terrible din of boos and whistles at the first note of La Marseillaise.The ministers could hardly hear their national anthem, but bellowed grimly through to the end. Every time a French player touched the ball he was met with jeers. With the French in the lead, four to one, the Algerians could stand it no longer. A woman, draped in the Algerian flag, jumped out of the stands and ran across the field. A stampede of spectators followed her and stopped the game. The crowd shouted “Algeria, Algeria!” and “We won!” as it began to pelt the presidential box with water bottles and cell phone batteries. Two lady ministers were hit. Minister for Youth and Sport Marie-George Buffet took a water bottle on the nose, and another had her fur coat ripped by a missile. The two sought safety in the ladies restroom. Security guards — beefed up from the usual 800 for such events to 1,200 on this occasion — managed to evacuate the stadium without much violence but home-bound Algerians sacked a commuter train and mugged passengers. As Mr. Buchanan notes, the weeks of arson and mayhem France went thorough in October and November of last year were hardly without warning.
The French have been as bumbling and indecisive in the face of mortal threat as the Americans — and the British and Germans and Italians and Australians. Whatever the combination of reasons — and I believe no one has adequately explained their psychological capitulation — elites have imposed the Third-World on Western societies against the express wishes of their inhabitants and voters. As Mr. Buchanan points out, countries like the United States and Australia can no longer be said to be democracies, and every white government has failed the test Enoch Powell set in 1968: “The supreme function of statesmanship is to provide against preventable evils . . . [T]he discussion of future grave but, with effort now, avoidable evils is the most unpopular and at the same time the most necessary occupation for the politician.”
The result is that, in Mr. Buchanan’s words:
We are conducting an experiment rooted neither in common sense nor the American experience, but in an ideology that declares, against all historical evidence, that people of every country, creed, culture, or civilization are equally and easily assimilable into America, and all have an equal right to come here.
Mr. Buchanan proposes a sound list of remedies. He would build a 2,000-mile barrier along the entire southern border. He says it should be a 15-foot-high double wall with a road in between for the Border Patrol. It would cost about $8 billion but could be paid for if we charged $2.00 per person to enter the country legally.
Mr. Buchanan recognizes it would be a big job to cart off all the illegals, but believes they will go voluntarily if employers are strictly punished for hiring them, welfare and education benefits are cut off, and local police get the power to arrest on immigration charges.
Mr. Buchanan would end the “diversity lottery,” abolish birth-right citizenship, and make illegals ineligible for Social Security or the Earned Income Tax Credit. He would also end federal subsidies for cities that declared themselves “sanctuaries” for illegals, and would stop issuing visas to countries that refuse to take back unwanted citizens. If we do this, he writes, “in five to ten years our crisis will be at an end. But if we don’t do this, the crisis will end America.”
These measures would, indeed, be a marvelous beginning, and the success of Mr. Buchanan’s book suggests such a program would have broad support. Even if only half his program were enacted, it would be a great achievement. In the long term, of course, even if all immigration, legal and illegal, were halted tomorrow, differential birthrates would continue to eat away at the white majority, but our decline would slow from a gallop to a walk. Whites might even have babies again if they lived in a society they knew was dedicated to preserving European civilization and the people who created it.
The day may yet come when our people can say, along with Pat Buchanan, “America belongs to us, not the world.”
Jared Taylor and Paul Kersey explain why they expect continuing progress in our movement. Our contest is not a sprint but a marathon, and patient efforts will be rewarded. They also discuss the significance of the return of a white farmer to Zimbabwe, latest developments in the Justine Damond killing, and the shameful of Islamization of Christmas in Europe.
Jared Taylor and Paul Kersey agree that Twitter’s new policies prove that the establishment must silence the most convincing forms of dissent. They also discuss an AP analysis of crime that actually hints at what the problem is, the black woman who is to be president of the Heritage Foundation, new frontiers of nuttiness in “whiteness studies,” and the European Commissioner for Migration’s call for white suicide.
Jared Taylor and Paul Kersey discuss two recent elections: the senate race in Alabama and the mayoral race in Atlanta. The stark racial divide in Alabama was widely noted; in Atlanta it was ignored. They also summarize the remarkable findings of AmRen’s study on hate-crime hoaxes and a surprisingly subversive op-ed in “The Hill” that proposes “elective separation” of the races.
Why Race Matters: Race Differences and What They Mean, Michael Levin, Praeger Publishers, 1997, 415 pp., $65.00.
Michael Levin’s long-awaited book on race has finally arrived, every bit as powerful and insightful as his admirers had hoped it would be. Why Race Matters does exactly what the title promises — it removes all illusions about the insignificance of race, and explains what racial differences mean for a multi-racial society. It is a thorough, overwhelmingly convincing treatment of America’s most serious and least understood problem. Like the work of Arthur Jensen and Philippe Rushton, it destroys the egalitarian myth, but Prof. Levin parts company with other academics in his willingness to tell us what biology means for policy. Facts imply conclusions, and this book draws them.
As Prof. Levin points out, a book like Why Race Matters should not have to be written. The only sensible conclusion to be drawn from simple observation is that races differ: “To put the matter bluntly, the question is not why anyone would believe the races are unequal in intelligence, but why anyone would believe them equal.” For centuries, people as different as Arabs and Englishmen have judged Africans to be unintelligent, lascivious, jolly, and keen on rhythm. Today, in whatever corner of the globe one looks, blacks behave in certain consistent ways.
Nevertheless, every important racial policy in this country is based on the assumption that race differences in ability are known not to exist. Current beliefs are a remarkable victory of dogma over not only the evidence of our senses but the findings of science.
Prof. Levin begins by presenting the data. This has been done many times by others, and the basics need not be repeated here. Prof. Levin capably and thoroughly presents twin studies, adoption studies, test data, and heritability estimates, all while dismantling the desperate attempts of egalitarians to dismiss them.
There is now not much informed opposition (though a great deal of uninformed opposition) to the conclusion that IQ tests test intelligence, that intelligence is at least partly hereditary, and that the races differ in average IQ. The last-ditch battle of the egalitarians is to try to save the idea that race differences are caused by environment — primarily by malevolent white people, past and present.
To counter this view, Prof. Levin gives a thorough account of recent work on the strictly biological correlates of intelligence. When smart people think, their brains emit different electrophysiological signals from those of the less smart. Prof. Levin notes that advances in the study of brain waves could probably establish quite precise racial differences, but fear appears to have halted the research. Brain size also has a robust correlation with intelligence, and intelligent people’s brains metabolize glucose relatively slowly.
Egalitarians claim that childhood nutrition accounts for this sort of thing, but the differences remain when nutrition is held constant (when only those blacks and whites who get the same diet are compared). Moreover, black children mature more rapidly than white children, are more athletic, and go on to dominate professional sports — not what one would expect from the malnourished. Likewise, diet does not explain metabolic or brain size differences in fraternal twins reared in the same family on the same food. If the anti-biology camp is not to be silenced completely it must argue that people unconsciously single out children with large heads for favorable treatment or give white children subtle training in how to retard glucose oxidation.
It is nevertheless theoretically possible that the most hotly-defended egalitarian position is correct: that the black-white IQ gap persists only because the two populations are reared in different environments. According to this view, blacks and whites should be thought of as identical twins reared apart, but with the black twin’s environment so dismal it robbed him of 15 IQ points.
Such a view might be plausible if intelligence is easily molded, but it is not. Prof. Levin points out that since it is generally accepted that 70 percent of the variation in IQ is controlled by genes and only 30 percent by environment, “it is almost but not quite irrational to believe that the interracial IQ difference of +1 SD [standard deviation, or 15 points] can be completely explained by differences in black and white environments.” Blacks and whites would have to live in fantastically different worlds (Prof. Levin calculates them as 1.85 SD apart) to account for this IQ difference, yet the difference has been unchanged by integration, huge transfers of wealth, and the very considerable reduction in the gap between black and white environments.
There have, of course, been many attempts to raise black IQ by “enriching” the environment. As Prof. Levin explains, the most ambitious such efforts, including Head Start, the Perry Preschool Program, and the Milwaukee Project all failed to produce lasting gains in IQ. Recent ingenious testing methods for young children have shown that the one SD difference between blacks and whites is present by age three. It is hard to imagine white society managing to damage black children permanently during the very years when most blacks have virtually no contact with whites.
The tenacity with which egalitarians hold to social rather than biological explanations for group differences probably bespeaks a fear that biology is immutable in its power to determine our lives. And yet, if blacks are so vulnerable to environment that they have been collectively beaten out of 15 points of IQ, environment must be just as ruthless and deterministic as biology. The difference is that so long as there is a chance that white people are to blame for black failure, there is joy in denouncing and persecuting “racists.” All the fun goes out of the game if nature, not bigots, is to blame. Thus, as Prof. Levin explains, so long as there is even the flimsiest, post facto environmental explanation for differences, there will be zealots to defend it.
In the end, however, unless the data are somehow suppressed, Prof. Levin expects the Human Genome Project to identify intelligence-related genes and to show that they are not distributed with the same frequency in all races. He expects the distributions to match the social science data, which is indirect but relentlessly consistent. He tips his hat to W.E.B. Du Bois who, he says, will stand vindicated by science. When Du Bois spoke of “the talented tenth” — the minority of blacks on whom racial progress depends — he was very close to the truth. Approximately 12 percent of blacks are born at or above the white average in intelligence.
The modern debate about IQ has been quietly raging ever since Arthur Jensen relaunched it in 1969. Since many of the data are now unassailable, debate centers on how they should be interpreted. Much of Prof. Levin’s book is therefore devoted to taking the stuffing out of the sometimes comical arguments of people like Steven Jay Gould and Andrew Hacker. As the book shows, egalitarians are always shifting their ground, ignoring data, and creating mysteries where none exists.
Examples of the latter are the currently fashionable views that race is a purely social artifact that should be junked, and that intelligence is undefined and unknowable. Prof. Levin notes that acrobatics of this kind are pure tendentiousness. Those who would discard the idea of race in any discussion of IQ find it essential for affirmative action. As for the pose that intelligence is unknowable:
People who make a point in argument of not understanding ‘intelligence’ invariably do understand it in all other contexts. They know an ‘intelligent’ child is one who learns quickly, and that, of the two, Nobel laureates tend to be more ‘intelligent’ than manual laborers . . . People pretend not to understand ‘intelligence,’ I suspect, to avoid embarrassment over race.
There is also much ignorant shrieking about the “bias” of IQ tests designed by white men, but it is an odd bias that permits Asians to outscore whites. As Prof. Levin explains, a real example of bias would be a test of hand-eye coordination that involved only the right hand. Lefties could prove the bias of such a test by demonstrating their ability with their left hands. “If the races are equally intelligent,” he writes, “it should be possible to find a task intuitively requiring intelligence that blacks perform as well as whites.” No such task has ever been found.
This is what leads otherwise reasonable people to insist that musical and athletic abilities are forms of intelligence in which blacks may surpass whites. As Prof. Levin points out, it tortures the language to claim that Babe Ruth was a genius, but egalitarians must either take fantastic positions or cease to be egalitarian.
Even scientists lose their bearings when it comes to race. It is now fashionable to point out — correctly — that there is more genetic variation among African populations than in all other groups combined and then to suggest — stupidly or deceitfully — that this means genetic racial differences do not matter. Prof. Levin patiently explains that there is vastly more genetic variation in dogs than in giraffes, but that does not prevent people from noticing that giraffes are taller than dogs. The egalitarian literature is full of “science” of this kind, and one of this book’s great strengths is its relentless pursuit and exposure of claims that may well be deliberately deceptive.
Egalitarians may be best at deceiving themselves, as Prof. Levin shows in his neat analysis of the trendy view that blacks cannot be racists. When people say this, they are probably thinking of “racism” as the claim that one’s race is superior to others. In some dark recess of their minds, liberals cannot imagine anyone really believing that blacks are superior to whites, so blacks cannot be “racist.” Since this reasoning is taboo, they instead claim that only members of “the dominant culture” or the group with “power” can be racist.
Prof. Levin is at his most original and provocative when he sets aside well-established data on intelligence and takes up the even more controversial question of morality. Other researchers have suggested that blacks differ from whites in ways other than IQ, but have not followed this argument very far.
For example, the widely used Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory (MMPI), which subdivides personality into a number of categories, shows consistent differences in how blacks and whites evaluate themselves. Blacks, for example, hold themselves in higher regard than whites (or, in today’s jargon, have “higher self-esteem”). They are consistently more likely to agree with statements like:
I am an important person.
I am entirely self-confident.
If given the chance I could make a good leader of people.
I have often had to take orders from someone who did not know as much as I did.
The common assumption that blacks are “taught to hate themselves” is wrong; blacks are quite pleased with themselves. At the same time, they consistently score higher than whites on the MMPI scales for such things as Hypomania, Psychopathy, Schizophrenia, and Masculinity, which are precisely the traits that distinguish incarcerated criminals from the rest of us. They tend to agree, for example, with statements like:
Most people are honest chiefly through fear of being caught.
Most people make friends because friends are likely to be useful to them.
Most people will use somewhat unfair means to gain profit or an advantage rather than lose it.
It is not hard for me to ask help from my friends even though I cannot return the favor.
Another finding is that blacks are more impulsive or present-oriented than whites. Given a choice between a small candy bar today and a big one tomorrow, black children are more likely than white children to want the small one today.
Finally, even within races, moral reasoning is closely associated with intelligence. Intelligence does not guarantee good behavior, but a certain level is necessary for self-knowledge and the comprehension of moral distinctions.
Prof. Levin does not flinch from drawing what may appear to be an unkind conclusion: Given the crime rates, social irresponsibility, lack of foresight, impulsiveness, and general self-centeredness of black behavior, blacks probably have a different inherent capacity and appreciation for morality.
He proposes that this difference can be explained by the environments in which blacks and whites (and Asians) evolved. In a warm climate where food can be gathered year-round, people do not need to develop habits of cooperation and planning in order to get through the winter. In the north, it took mutual trust and cooperation for groups of men to bring down large game, so reciprocal morality evolved along with intelligence.
Climate and terrain could also have influenced sexual behavior. Since African women could gather food for themselves and their children even if a mate abandoned them, there was less pressure to insist that men support their children. For the same reason, there was less evolutionary pressure on fathers to stick around. In the north, a man who abandoned his children might well leave no descendants to behave in like manner. And in fact, the family habits of Africans and transplanted blacks are extremely loose by white standards.
What we think of as moral behavior, including sexual morality, is now known to be heavily influenced by genes. As Prof. Levin points out, there is no biological reason to expect different populations to have evolved exactly the same distribution of morality-influencing genes. Therefore it is likely that “the races have . . . evolved divergent evaluations of cooperativeness, aggression, rule-following, and concern with the future.”
That blacks care less about others and worry less about the future is suggested in virtually every area of behavior. Crime is only the most obvious example, nor is it the expression of wretchedness and self-loathing that excuse-making whites pretend it to be. Prof. Levin notes that “the criminal behavior of young black males just does not look like an expression of despair. In account after account, these individuals come across as full of themselves and unrepentant.” He might have added that if blacks were really reduced to hopelessness by white oppression, they would presumably have high suicide rates, whereas in every age group blacks kill themselves at only one half to one quarter the white rate.
The other prominent black deviation from white morality is reckless procreation, but other traits are just as striking: unwillingness to do volunteer work, support charities, donate organs, volunteer as medical test subjects, keep quiet in theaters, recycle trash, save money, exercise, or keep houses in good repair. Black mothers are twice as likely as white mothers to smoke, drink, and take drugs during pregnancy, even when doctors tell them not to. Blacks between ages 15 and 24 are ten times as likely to have fatal gun accidents as whites of the same age even when gun availability is controlled for. By white standards, black behavior is impulsive, shiftless, and inconsiderate.
People respond better to norms their ancestors evolved than to norms imposed on them by strangers. This may explain why black children get into trouble when held to standards of classroom decorum not “natural” to African societies. It may also explain current calls for “respecting the black learning style” or for Afrocentric curricula, but it is hardly fair of blacks to insist that the rules be changed to suit them after pushing their way unbidden into white institutions.
The personality differences Prof. Levin emphasizes explain why standardized tests “overpredict” black performance. Black students do not get grades as good as their SAT scores suggest they should, and even when IQ is held constant blacks are more likely than whites to be criminals. Why? It is likely that impulsiveness, a lack of concern for the future, and a lower regard for moral norms keeps blacks from performing at the levels IQ alone would predict.
Prof. Levin nevertheless warns whites against the mistake of thinking any human standard is absolute. Blacks can find whites moralistic, repressed, and incomprehensible: “A degree of helpfulness considered obligatory by hunters is considered foolish by gatherers, whereas hunters might regard gatherers as selfish. Each may think “something is wrong’ with — and dislike — the other.” He goes on to say that for people who have evolved under different circumstances “a propensity to violate white norms need not be disordered or dysfunctional.” Such differences are inherently no more value-laden than the fact that owls live in trees and moles live in holes. Blacks are simply different from whites and it may be foolish to expect them to behave like whites.
Of course, in a society built to white standards, it is difficult to refrain from ranking groups invidiously according to intelligence and morality. Prof. Levin argues that whites may therefore have valid reasons for wanting to avoid blacks. In this sense whites may well think whites (and Asians) “better” than blacks. Is this shocking? “The ranking of individuals and groups goes uncontested in nonracial contexts,” he notes, and adds that “few egalitarians would have the effrontery to deny that the average minister has more qualities he admires than the average murderer.”
At the same time, low intelligence and low self-control may mean blacks are simply less able to govern themselves. In Prof. Levin’s view, “a person of limited mental ability, not given to worrying about the quality of his desires or the likely consequences of following them, is relatively less free. So are people who follow an impulse as soon as it enters their heads.” This suggests that “the white advantage in intelligence and self-restraint implies that, on average, whites are more autonomous and responsible for their actions than are blacks . . .” and that blacks may be “less capable of scrutinizing the self and its choices.”
Curiously, many liberals unintentionally speak of blacks in much the same way. They describe deviance as the understandable and even inevitable consequence of “oppression,” thus implicitly accepting black helplessness. The literature on race is filled with the hunt for “root causes,” which is another name for excuses. And yet if the environment excuses blacks why does it not excuse the whites who are said to oppress them? That liberals never speak sympathetically of the “root causes” of racism suggests they think whites are more autonomous and responsible than blacks.
Affirmative action is a somewhat less controversial subject but Prof. Levin tackles it with characteristic thoroughness and none of the mumbled apologies common even among “conservatives.” He notes that justifications for preference keep shifting:
“As the compensation argument has tottered — mainly with growing awareness that the beneficiaries of affirmative action have never been discriminated against, and that its white victims have never discriminated — there has been a migration to new grounds, few of which were heard of in 1965.” Nonsense about role models, self-esteem, fighting stereotypes, diversity, etc. is now spouted by “people who have forgotten, or never knew, why they supported racial preferences in the first place.”
Prof. Levin explains that the only valid excuse for preferences is compensation for past wrongs, but far from deserving compensation, American blacks have benefited enormously from life in a white-dominated society. Since black limitations are overwhelmingly likely to be inherent, whites have no obligation to help them overcome them. If anything, whites deserve compensation for the continuing violence and larceny they suffer at the hands of blacks.
Prof. Levin also points out the contradictions in affirmative action thinking when preferences are justified on probabalistic grounds: Even if it cannot be proven than any given black has suffered from white wickedness or that any given white has benefited from it, the chances are high enough to justify rewarding the one and punishing the other. However, preference advocates refuse to consider any probabalistic procedures that might inconvenience blacks. Blacks are vastly more violent than whites but liberals would gasp at the idea of making it more difficult for blacks than whites to own guns. Preventing violence is a far more legitimate role of government than promoting “diversity,” so why is probabalistic reasoning unwarranted in crime control?
Affirmative action also violates the liberals’ cherished notion that “separate is inherently unequal.” If separate employment or promotion standards are valid for blacks, why not separate schools — which would presumably be designed to meet their special needs? Incoherence on questions of this kind is mere cover for the conviction that the state may never allow race to be used against blacks but can require that it be used against whites.
Affirmative action is, of course, a policy that Prof. Levin would abolish today. While he is at it, he would legalize all private forms of discrimination. On libertarian grounds, people should be free to choose their associates or neighbors even for irrational reasons, and on empirical grounds it is often rational for whites to avoid blacks.
Prof. Levin would also abolish welfare. He argues that a social safety net may be a permissible luxury in a society of whites who will not abuse it but is, for blacks, too great a temptation to indolence. Likewise, the minimum wage is an unnecessary obstacle to blacks (and others) whose labor is simply not worth what government insists it should be.
Although blacks may be less able than whites to control behavior it does not mean wrongdoing should go unpunished, but that different punishments may be appropriate for different races. For blacks it should perhaps be swifter and include corporal punishment, especially for men who treat a jail term as a badge of honor and a rite of passage. It might also be sensible to try some black juveniles as adults, since blacks mature more rapidly than whites. Finally, since blacks have frequently shown themselves unable to transcend racial loyalty, they might be excluded from juries in trials that could inflame racial passion.
Interestingly, Prof. Levin’s exhaustive study of racial differences leads to policies strikingly similar to those of the pre-civil rights era American South. It may be no coincidence that the latest scientific findings support the traditions of whites who lived, for generations, in the most intimate contact with blacks.
The only real objection to this excellent book is what some readers will consider its excessive thoroughness. As the author himself concedes, he sometimes appears to be “defending the obvious with complicated rejoinders.” He explains that “where race is concerned, however, people seem capable of doubting what they elsewhere find self-evident, so argumentative overkill is difficult to avoid.”
The symbolic logic is confined to footnotes, but some readers will still find the overkill heavy going, especially when Prof. Levin veers into his own field of philosophy. Nevertheless, this is an invaluable volume, packed with insight and information, and deserves the close attention of anyone with a serious interest in the American racial dilemma.
[Editor’s Note: Why Race Matters is now available through American Renaissance for $19.95.]
Jared Taylor and Paul Kersey discuss Asian resistance to the Plexiglas ban, how the campaign to impeach Trump puts tribe over principle, John Conyer’s “retirement,” the California lawsuit to cure illiteracy, and the scandal over leaked Swedish crime data.
Jared Taylor and Paul Kersey discuss the hysteria in Britain over Donald Trump’s retweet of three short videos critical of Islam. They also analyze the verdict in the Kate Steinle murder trial, the media assumption that we (racial dissidents) are monsters, the latest anti-white hate tirades, the NFL’s $89 million bribe to black players, and fresh demographic projections for Europe.
We all know that major internet companies are in on a campaign to stop “hate.” That means disabling Facebook accounts, banning Twitter users, censoring YouTube, and even deactivating URLs.
YouTube has just quarantined another video on the American Renaissance channel. On October 17th, we put up a video about eugenics called “Let’s Break a Taboo, Part II.” YouTube just informed us that it has made the video impossible to search, will never recommend it, has disabled comments, and now makes you click through a warning screen telling you some people think it’s “offensive.”
At least YouTube did not ban it completely. It does that if it thinks a video’s primary purpose is to incite violence or hatred. YouTube seems to think we are inciting hatred or violence only as a secondary purpose.
You can still watch the video, but only because this is a direct link. A Google or YouTube search will never find it. You might watch it and try to figure out what were the specific words or phrases YouTube thinks are so offensive.
Because, you see, YouTube never tells us. It just sends us a note saying, “Upon review, we have placed restrictions on how the video will be shown.” YouTube generously lets us “appeal” a quarantine—but gives us only about 40 words to do it. It then writes back to say, “After re-reviewing your video we’ve decided to leave the restrictions in place.” In other words, YouTube won’t—or more probably can’t—explain what it didn’t like.
Several weeks ago, YouTube sent “How to Achieve Racial Separation” to the back of the bus. Take a look at it here. We’d like to know what is offensive about a plan to eliminate racial friction.
As for “Let’s Break a Taboo, Part II,” you can read the entire script below. Let us know which are the passages you think triggered the censors.
Let’s Break a Taboo, Part II
My last video was called “You Already Believe in Eugenics.” In it I explained that eugenics simply means encouraging human genetic combinations that avoid bad traits and promote good traits.
The word was coined by the great British scientist, Francis Galton, and eugenics was at its height during the first half of the 20th century. Some famous supporters were Winston Churchill, Linus Pauling, John Maynard Keynes, Teddy Roosevelt, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Arthur Balfour, Luther Burbank, Alexander Graham Bell, and Woodrow Wilson.
By 1925, over a hundred colleges offered courses in eugenics, and most Ivy League schools provided massive funding for eugenic studies. High school text books said eugenics was necessary to protect American society.
Socialists and women promoted eugenics because they thought improving the nation’s population would help the poor and reduce inequality. H.G. Wells supported eugenics for that reason, and so did Bertrand Russel and Beatrice and Sidney Webb. The Webbs founded Fabian socialism. Harold Laski, who later headed the British Labor Party was also a strong supporter.
Opposition to eugenics came from Catholics and from conservatives who thought decisions about mating should be left entirely up to individuals.
In the United States it was common to give free lectures on eugenics, and eugenics societies held fitter families contests, in which families were judged by experts on their desirable qualities. Here is a family of three generations of winners, with their trophies.
Encouraging people with good qualities to have children was not so controversial; sterilization to prevent reproduction was. In 1907, Indiana was the first state to pass such a law, which was intended “to prevent the procreation of confirmed criminals, idiots, imbeciles, and rapists.”
By 1931, 30 states had eugenic sterilization laws.
Most people now associate eugenics with Nazis and the Holocaust, but Germany passed its own sterilization law relatively late, in 1933, after many other European countries. As a percentage of the population, the Swedes sterilized twice as many people as the Germans did.
The policy against Jews was not a eugenics policy. Nazis considered Jews an enemy people, not genetically inferior. The Nazis also had a notorious euthanasia program, under which 80,000 severely retarded and incurably insane people were killed to free up hospital beds, but that wasn’t part of the eugenics program either.
After the war, eugenics became so associated with Nazism that it drove people to take crazy positions. Geneticist Theodosius Dobzhansky of Columbia said that there is no such thing as a bad gene. J.D. Smith of the University of South Carolina wrote that we need to protect the genes for mental retardation because it “is a human condition worthy of being valued.”
Fortunately, few people are that nutty anymore, but Americans are still very skittish about applying genetic principles to people.
Asians are much more realistic. Japan didn’t repeal its sterilization law until 1996. The Chinese will not let you marry if you have any of a whole list of conditions. In Singapore, the government gave tax incentives to better-educated women to have more children. The idea was that smart women marry smart men, and they have smart children. The percentage of Singapore births that were to college-educated women rose from 37 to 48 percent.
Meanwhile, in the United Sates, trends are in the opposite direction. Lower IQ people are having more children than higher-IQ people. If you test American children for IQ and then find out how many brothers and sisters they have you get a clear correlation: The higher the IQ, the fewer the siblings. There is a negative correlation of .18 between child IQ and family size.
The British scholar Richard Lynn, who has probably studied the question more thoroughly than anyone else alive, concludes that this means the genetic basis for intelligence for white Americans is dropping at a rate of about one IQ point per generation.
For blacks, it’s worse. Black women are about twice as likely as black men to get a bachelors degree, and even more likely to get a masters degree. Many educated black women never end up marrying, while blacks on welfare have many children. Prof. Lynn estimates that the genetic basis for intelligence for blacks is declining by about two IQ points per generation.
Prof. Lynn also notes that more than half of the single women on welfare in the United States are in the bottom 20 percent of the IQ range. They are likely to be passing on other undesirable traits, along with low intelligence.
What can be done about this? First, many people think that any woman on welfare should not bring more children into the world for the rest of us to feed, house, clothe, and try to educate. Would it be wrong to require that woman have implantable contraceptives so long as they are on welfare?
Nobel-Prize winner William Shockley had a different idea: Offer people $1,000 for every IQ point below the average of 100, in exchange for voluntary sterilization. A person with an IQ of 90—ten points below the average—would get $10,000. Some people would object that low-IQ people aren’t competent to make decisions like that, but I don’t hear them saying low-IQ people aren’t competent enough to vote. And if they can’t make decisions, should they have children?
What about promoting desirable traits?
Psychologist Raymond Cattell suggested that the government should seek out the most intelligent children in the country and pay their parents to have more. David Lykken of the University of Minnesota suggests that only people who are screened and licensed should have children. Sociologist Hugh LaFollette points out that couples have to meet strict standards to adopt a child. Why should it be any different for making a child?
In a healthy society, it would be possible to promote the idea that smart, capable people should have many children, and others should have fewer.
But, as usual, in practical terms, Asians are way ahead of us.
The Beijing Genomics Institute is the largest genetic research facility in the China, probably in the world. BGI is hunting very hard for the genes that influence intelligence and other traits. And when they find them, they will do what’s called embryo screening.
This is how it works: You take, say, 100 eggs from a woman and fertilize them in vitro with sperm from her husband. You screen the embryos and implant the one that is most promising. In intelligence alone, you would have a 30-point variation above and below the average child that couple would have had, so you could choose an embryo that was 15 points higher in IQ. You would have a similar range of other traits. It’s only a matter of time before the technology is perfected.
In the West, squeamish governments will certainly ban embryo screening, but facilities for it will pop up on the Cayman Islands or the Bahamas. Rich people will go for designer babies; poor people won’t have the choice.
What may turn out to be a simpler procedure is CRISPR gene editing. This involves making direct changes to the genome by removing undesirable genes and adding better ones. In the West, scientists want to ban this technique for humans. Not the Chinese.
They have a plan: First, eliminate mental retardation, mental illness, and all genetic diseases. Second, promote intelligence, diligence, and other favorable traits.
Any country that uses modern techniques on a large scale—and China is determined to be the first—will shoot to the top in every field.
Francis Galton, who coined the term “eugenics,” saw this coming 100 years ago. “The nation which first subjects itself to rational eugenical disciplines,” he said “is bound to inherit the earth.”
One reason we refuse to take genetics seriously is that it would mean we could no longer pretend that all groups are equal, that blacks are genetically no different from whites and Asians. Our refusal to accept genetic differences between races makes it hard to understand population genetics at all. Asians don’t have that problem, so they can think clearly about the long-term genetic future of their people.
We have a choice: Are we going to take modern science seriously? Or are we going to keep pretending that preschool programs can turn every ghetto child into a nuclear physicist? Do you or don’t you care if our population continues to decline while other countries take a different course?
If you don’t care, I have some advice: Make sure your grandchildren learn Chinese.
The post YouTube Sends Another AmRen Video to the Back of the Bus appeared first on American Renaissance.
Jared Taylor and Paul Kersey describe the media reaction to the FBI’s warning about black extremists who believe killing white cops is a form of liberation. They also dissect the latest attacks on Thanksgiving, Google and Twitter’s attempts to censor the internet, and draw lessons from the 37-year reign of Sir Robert Gabriel Mugabe.
The post “Black Identity Extremists:” Not a Threat After All appeared first on American Renaissance.
Frank Salter, On Genetic Interests: Family, Ethny and Humanity in an Age of Mass Migration, Peter Lang, 2003, 388 pp., $38.95 (softcover)
With the publication of On Genetic Interests, Frank Salter has made a vitally important contribution to our understanding of the significance of race and ethnicity in human affairs. Dr. Salter, an Australian who has been a researcher since 1991 at the Max Planck Society in Andechs, Germany, offers a perspective that is no less significant than that of Philippe Rushton, Richard Lynn, Arthur Jensen, Michael Levin, or anyone else whose work throws light on scientific questions long obscured by taboo.
Dr. Salter demonstrates through principles of population genetics that racial or ethnic groups are equivalent to large, extended families, and that ethnic loyalties are as legitimate as family loyalties. Indeed, he argues that members of an ethnic group may have more compelling duties to the group even than to their own families. He then outlines the social and political implications of his position, with particular emphasis on the role of the state and the disastrous consequences of mass immigration.
His views bring Dr. Salter into almost perfect harmony with the positions of American Renaissance. His book can therefore be seen as a scientific justification for racial consciousness and activism.
What is Genetic Interest?
According to Darwinian theory, the goal towards which all living things strive is to make copies of their distinctive genes. This is seen most clearly in the devotion of parents to children. As Dr. Salter writes, “The importance of genetic continuity is an end in itself, for humans as well as for other species.” From an evolutionary point of view, “propagating one’s genes is life’s raison d’être.”
Perhaps the most important conceptual breakthrough in On Genetic Interests is to recognize that loyalty to one’s ethny — Dr. Salter prefers this term to race, nation, or ethnic group — is just as valid biologically as loyalty to one’s children. This is because each ethny is a storehouse of its members’ distinctive genes, just as children are carriers of their parents’ genes. A person’s children are very concentrated stores of his genes, but his ethny is a vastly larger, though more dilute, pool of the same genes. Given the size of most ethnies, they are repositories of far more copies of a member’s distinctive genes than even his own children, and therefore have a theoretical genetic claim to loyalty even greater than that of his children.
An ethny is an extended family. The larger one’s ethny, the larger a store it becomes of distinctive genes, so its members have an interest in seeing their numbers rise or at least remain constant. A shrinking ethny is like a family whose members are dying off — either condition represents a loss of genetic interests.
According to the universalist, everyone’s-equal model of human relations that is supposed to govern how we think about race, there is no good reason any of us should care more about our children than we do about the children of strangers. We do, of course, and not because they are objectively superior to other children but because they are ours, that is to say, they carry our distinctive genes. From a genetic point of view, our ethnies deserve similar loyalties for the same reason.
Dr. Salter points out that different ethnies can be so genetically distant that random members of the same ethny are close kin in comparison to members of the other ethny. Ethnic loyalty thus becomes a continuation of family loyalty. Australian Aborigines and Mbuti pygmies, for example, are about as genetically distant as two ethnies can be. Two random members of either group are — in comparison to members of the other group — so genetically similar to each other they are almost the equivalent of identical twins. Compared to Australian Aborigines, all Mbuti pygmies are, in fact, so similar to each other that actual Mbuti identical twins are, relatively speaking, not much more closely related to each other than any two random Mbuti.
When parents from distant ethnies have children together it can lead to surprising results. Rules of genetics hold that children always carry half the genes of each parent. However, when parents are from the same ethny, they have many distinctive genes in common, so their children actually carry more than half of each parent’s distinctive genes. In this sense, parents who descend from the same lineage and who share many of the same genes are more closely related to their children — in terms of the number of genes they share — than are parents who have children with someone of a distant stock.
Surprising as this may seem, if an Australian and a Mbuti were to have a child together, each parent would be more closely related genetically to everyone in his original ethny than he would be to the child. Complete strangers would be closer kin than the child, and from a strictly genetic standpoint would have a greater claim on family loyalty.
Most ethnies are not as distant as aborigines and Mbuti. However, the same principles apply. Outmarriage with a member of a distant ethny produces children who are relative genetic strangers to their parents.
How do these findings square with the fact that there is more genetic variation within racial groups than between them? Richard Lewontin famously pointed out that if the total genetic variation of humans is given a figure of 100, 85 to 90 percent of that variation is found withinpopulation groups, and only 10 to 15 percent are distinct variations not shared by all groups.
Propagandists have used these figures mistakenly to suggest that someone could be more closely related to a person of a different race than to someone of his own race, but their real significance is to highlight the importance of the 10 to 15 percent. We share 90 percent of our genes with mice, but there is more genetic variation within a single human ethny than the variations that separate us from mice. Yet all humans are obviously more closely related to each other than to mice — they are identical twins by comparison. The small genetic variations are where the important differences lie, and it is in the area of these small differences that all Mbuti are practically identical twins by comparison with Aborigines.
Loyalty to an ethny is the genetic equivalent of family loyalty. Therefore, if immigration replaces parts of a native ethny with aliens, for the natives who remain, this genetic shift means replacement of kinfolk with strangers. Just how drastic the effect can be depends on how genetically distant the newcomers are.
Dr. Salter here makes a striking comparison that he developed in a November 2002 article for Population and Environment that was summarized in the February 2003 issue of AR. He notes that Danes and Englishmen are kindred populations but still genetically distinct. If 10,000 Danes were to take the place of 10,000 Englishmen it would represent a loss of genetic interests to the English who remained, because the distinctive genes of Englishmen would be replaced by those of a different ethny. Dr. Salter calculates how great the loss would be: So many English genes would disappear that it would be the equivalent of removing from the population 167 children or siblings of the native population that remained. (The figure is the same for either children or siblings because a person shares the same number of genes — 50 percent — with a child or a sibling. The loss in genetic interests could be calculated differently, as the equivalent of 167 × 2 = 334 cousins, nephews or aunts.) Because the English gene pool is a storehouse for all Englishmen of the genes common to them and that make them unique, this loss of 167 sibling-equivalents would be a loss of genetic interests for all members of the English ethny.
The loss is far greater if the English are replaced by more distant ethnies. If, instead of Danes, 10,000 Bantus replaced 10,000 Englishmen, it would be the genetic equivalent of the loss of 10,854 children or siblings. As Dr. Salter explains, “Some ethnies are so different genetically that they amount to negative stores of those distinctive genes.” The effect works both ways: If 10,000 English replaced 10,000 Bantus, the loss of Bantu genetic interests would be just as great.
Dr. Salter draws the inevitable conclusion:
[A]n act of charity or heroism by an Englishman that prevented 10,000 Danes from replacing 10,000 English would be adaptive even if the act cost the altruist his or her life and with it all prospects of raising a family (at least a family of less than 167 children), since this would save the equivalent of 167 of the altruist’s children. Preventing replacement by 10,000 Bantu would warrant a much larger sacrifice because the genetic benefit is about 65 times larger; random Englishmen are almost as related as parent and child compared to the relationship between Englishmen and Bantu. (There is intuitive wisdom in the fact that blacks who live in white societies — but not those living in Africa — refer to each other as “brother” and “sister.” In comparison to genetically distant whites, they are essentially brothers.)
Dr. Salter goes further:
The genetic distance between English and Bantus is so great that, on the face of it, competition between them would make within-group altruism among random English (or among random Bantu) almost as adaptive as parent-child altruism . . . Thus it would appear to be more adaptive for an Englishman to risk life or property resisting the immigration of two Bantu immigrants to England than his taking the same risk to rescue one of his own children from drowning . . .
Extreme as this conclusion may sound, it is justified from a genetic point of view.
Dr. Salter explains that immigration does not appear to be replacement, because natives are not directly eliminated to make room for newcomers. However, the long-term effect is direct replacement, because each part of the world will eventually reach the limits of its capacity to support humans. At that point, the presence of 10,000 Bantus (and their descendents) would mean England could not sustain an equal number of additional Englishmen. The immigration of Bantus would then appear in its true guise — displacement of Englishmen.
The effects of immigration are even more severe if the newcomers are of low productivity and drag down the carrying capacity of a territory. The larger the number of Bantus, the more quickly England would reach the limits of its capacity to support a population, and the number of Englishmen their presence forestalled would be even greater.
On the other hand, highly productive immigrants can be a genetic gain to natives. The white farmers of Zimbabwe were aliens, and their presence was a genetic loss for native blacks. However, they raised Zimbabwe’s productivity so much that many more blacks were able to live and reproduce. Expelling whites is in the short-term genetic interests of Zimbabwe’s blacks, but without them the country can support far fewer blacks — a clear genetic loss. It is in the genetic interests of unproductive people to welcome a certain number of very productive aliens.
Of course, today, most immigrants leave failing societies for successful societies, and are less productive than the host people. As Dr. Salter writes, “When the society is attractive due to wealth or stability, the ethny rapidly declines in relative fitness as the rest of the world floods in.” Natives are both replaced genetically and see the quality of their society decline.
This is why, until the triumph of ideologies that ignore biology, ethnies always guarded their homelands jealously. A population may decline in numbers but later recover if it has a territory to which it has exclusive title. A decline in numbers accompanied by loss of territory — or merely the effective loss of territory due to immigration by aliens — can lead to irreparable damage. Dr. Salter writes that “for all of past human experience and still today control of territory is a precious resource for maintaining ethnic genetic interests in the long run.” This is why “immigration policy for most societies in most ages has consisted of a blanket ban.” From a genetic standpoint, immigrants are no different from armed invaders.
Virtually all people recognize the legitimacy of family loyalty but many condemn group loyalty — at least for whites. Some of these people would argue that culture rather than biological continuity is the ultimate value. However, as Dr. Salter points out, this is a false distinction:
We can conceptualize copies of our genes in phenotypic terms: as shared blood, as family, and as familiar appearance and behavior. Valuing such characteristics is to value the genes that contribute to them.
Intelligence, personality, and appearance are closely tied to genes, and certain traits will disappear if distinctive genes disappear. For that reason, as Dr. Salter writes, “Group genetic interests track cultural values,” so preserving an ethny’s genes preserves its culture.
It is both in the cultural and broad genetic sense that a person’s ethny can be said to deserve even greater loyalty than his family, whenever the ethny is threatened. If a man’s family is wiped out it is a great personal tragedy. However, if his whole tribe disappears, it takes with it far more copies of his genes than he could ever produce as children. It also takes with it the culture and folkways that make his ethny what it is. In this sense, cultural and ethnic extinction is infinitely more terrible than one’s own death or the death of one’s family.
Despite much talk about the desirability of “diverse” societies, most people like living among people like themselves. If they must live in a multi-ethnic society, they want to be the majority population that puts its stamp on the national culture and way of life.
Dr. Salter points out the advantages of homogeneity. First, it is probably necessary for the development of sound institutions. As John Stuart Mill pointed out, “Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different nationalities.” This is because when a society is composed of “a people without fellow-feeling . . . the united public opinion necessary to the working of representative government cannot exist.”
Liberty reposes upon institutions like the rule of law, freedom of speech, and republican government that require trust among a people, and are not likely to arise in mixed, mutually suspicious populations. Dr. Salter notes that sound institutions established by homogeneous populations can continue to function even after immigration by diverse groups, but suspects that as elections degenerate into racial head counts and free speech is sacrificed in the name of “sensitivity,” multiculturalism eventually undermines even the best institutions.
Dr. Salter also points out that welfare policies are most generous in homogeneous societies, and that even liberal scholars agree that this is probably because taxpayers are more willing to vote benefits to strangers who are at least like themselves. In Moscow, for example, beggars reportedly get the most handouts from people of their own ethny. People generally resist welfare that subsidizes reckless procreation by racial or ethnic aliens. It is natural that they should; in genetic terms, this is collective cuckoldry.
Even aside from outright welfare, since so much modern government activity involves taking money from one group and giving it to another, people are more likely to support a government if they think benefits are going to ethnic kinfolk. At the private level, citizens are also more likely to give blood, support schools, endow parks, and volunteer for community work if they know members of their own group will benefit. Less productive minorities, on the other hand, profit greatly from wealthy societies that offer benefits to all, regardless of ethnic origin.
Dr. Salter also points out that “raising children within national communities would increase the likelihood of them marrying fellow ethnics.” This is good for several reasons. Children from same-ethny marriages are more closely related to their parents. To continue with the previous example, Dr. Salter argues that if an Englishman marries an Englishwoman, his children will carry 92 percent more of his distinctive genes than if he marries a Bantu. In terms of making copies of his own genes, each child with an Englishwoman is almost like having two with a Bantu.
It may also be that parents of the same ethny treat their children better than do parents in mixed marriages, with the biological similarity of parent and child leading to more intimate bonding. The children in such marriages also share more genes with each other, and may develop deeper ties. Identical twins have the closest sibling bonds of all, and the more genes siblings share, the more they become like identical twins.
Another benefit of same-ethny marriages is that children will have no conflicting loyalties if tensions arise between the ethnies in a multi-ethnic society. Mixed children are sometimes unsure of their identities, and may be rejected by both groups.
Dr. Salter notes that it is obviously a genetic loss to adopt a child of a different ethny because the efforts of child-rearing are devoted to alien genes. Such adoptions can even be seen as disloyalty to a homogeneous society, because they mean government benefits to the children force other members of the group to support genetic free riders.
The multicultural societies that result from immigration give rise to many problems for the host population. “From an evolutionary perspective,” writes Dr. Salter, “many collective goods in modern [mixed] societies represent an opportunity for enlightened free riding.” Immigrants benefit from schools, hospitals, parks, museums, and national infrastructure to which they did not contribute and which their own ethnies may not be able to produce or maintain. Natives resent this, but Dr. Salter observes that “multicultural regimes deploy modern forms of ritual indoctrination to defeat inborn discriminatory responses to ethnic diversity, at least by majority ethnies.” As a result, “in mainstream Western societies majority ethnic group strategies have all but vanished and free riding is largely uncontrolled.”
Many multicultural societies even encourage minorities to mobilize for the express purpose of extracting benefits from the majority. Majority members may end up distrusting a government that acts against their genetic interests, and Dr. Salter finds evidence that as a society becomes more varied, there is a decrease in public altruism; people prefer to do good works for their ethnic kin rather than for distant ethnies.
In Europe, white majorities are beginning to understand the high price they pay for multiculturalism. In Dr. Salter’s view, every example of ethnic tension or non-assimilation is a valuable warning sign that the majority population has made a serious mistake: “For a people losing its country, the only thing more disastrous than multiculturalism that does not ‘work’ would be multi-culturalism that did work.”
How should an ethny go about preserving its genetic interests? “It stands to reason,” writes Dr. Salter, “that it would be prudent for a population to defend its most precious collective interest — distinctive genes carried by the ethny — with the most powerful means at its disposal.” The most powerful means, of course, is government. And yet, almost every government has failed in this respect because “no state yet developed has reliably kept its promise as an adaptive ethnic group strategy.”
At one time, nation-states were made up essentially of ethnies, and defended genetic interests — even if not in so many words. Nation states acted naturally in what they took to be the benefit of their citizens, defending national territory against invasion, armed or unarmed. Dr. Salter notes that “the nation state is a psychological substitute for the primordial band and tribe,” and that “the political rhetoric of national identity and mobilization is rich in kinship metaphors such as the founding fathers, the motherland, brothers-in-arms, and fraternity.” No other appeal can elicit the same level of devotion or sacrifice.
Dr. Salter adds that by today’s standards nation-states were frankly xenophobic and benefited from it: “In the past, ethnocentric culture has usually been adaptive. Indoctrination is a powerful strategy for encouraging ethnocentric thinking, one that allows leaders to mobilize the community for defense.” Mobilization can go too far, and lead to aggressive war that wastes lives even if it adds territory, but some level of nationalism is necessary for any people to maintain itself.
The problem with the state, as Dr. Salter sees it, is that “in modern societies, especially Western ones, there is no mechanism for ensuring the loyalty of cultural elites.” Mass immigration, which the government of virtually every white nation has imposed on its people, is the most egregious act of disloyalty. As Dr. Salter explains:
This reverses the state’s role as defender of the people’s ultimate interest to that of an enemy of that interest. The people lose their historical investment in the nation state, which is effectively hijacked for private purposes. Globalism can thus strip ethnies of their most powerful instrument for pursuing ethnic interests.
The state, which should protect genetic interests, now actively dissipates it, and ceases to deserve loyalty: “It would hardly be adaptive to risk one’s life, or that of one’s son, to defend a state apparatus that presided over the replacement or subordination of one’s people.” Indeed, as Dr. Salter explains, “citizens would be justified, based on adaptive utilitarian ethics, to reform or tear down their states and build new ones whose ethnic composition and constitution better serve their genetic survival.”
In this context, Dr. Salter draws attention to the irony of white populations sacrificing themselves in two world wars only to see their governments adopt immigration policies that represent far greater genetic losses than all the deaths on the battlefield. These populations have every reason to replace governments that have betrayed them.
Although many nations in the past were established with at least the implicit goal of protecting and benefiting a particular people, almost none has been explicit about it. Israel is exceptional in that it is an avowed homeland for Jews, but even it has failed to prevent non-Jewish immigration. Dr. Salter writes that a biologically informed ethny should build a government around an explicitly ethnic constitution:
“An ethnic constitution would correct some of the weaknesses in the traditional nation state. Existing constitutions are limited to defending proximate interests. But the ultimate interest is not happiness, nor liberty, nor individual life itself but genetic survival. A scientifically informed constitution that takes the people’s interests seriously cannot omit reference to their genetic interests.” Such an ethnic state would be, essentially, a contract entered into by a people in the name of its posterity.
Dr. Salter argues that the right to live in an ethnic state is as important a human right as any other: “Like the freedom to raise a family, it is in everyone’s interest to have his ethnic interests protected by the power of the state and to be free to invest in his ethny by contributing to collective goods that are proofed against free riders.” A world composed of ethnic states need not be hostile. On the contrary, each state would recognize the validity of every other group’s genetic interests, and could cooperate for mutual benefit. Immigration and the replacement of genes would end.
As Dr. Salter notes, for any territory, immigration policy is the equivalent of controlling evolution, in that it favors the propagation of certain genes at the expense of others. Each territory would, in this sense, guide its own evolution.
Ethnic separation is obviously desirable for states that decide to turn their backs on multiculturalism, but Dr. Salter proposes federalism if ethnies cannot be unscrambled. A weak national government could take responsibility for defense and foreign relations, leaving all other matters, including immigration policy, to local authorities.
Jumping the Tracks
Why has ethnic loyalty been discredited in recent decades while family loyalty — which is based on the same genetic interests — is recognized as legitimate? Dr. Salter is not sure, but notes that “families represent such a high and reliable concentration of their members’ distinctive genes that innate psychological mechanisms have evolved to monitor and protect that ultimate interest . . . This has not occurred in the case of the tribe.” Why not? We have been evolving in families since before we were human, and once we became human, tribal bonds were so tight there were no real opportunities short of outright treason to work for the genetic interests of other ethnies. Tribal loyalties are therefore weaker and more easily subverted.
As Dr. Salter explains, “The novelty of industrial society has tended to decouple social patterns from ethnic interests.” At the same time, “modern indoctrination techniques, most notably universal education and the mass media, tend to break down ethnic solidarity, causing altruism to be directed towards genetically distant individuals.” The result is that, “despite being outfitted with the potential for both family and ethnic feelings, humans are not as instinctively equipped to identify and defend ethnic genetic interests in the evolutionarily novel world of mass anonymous societies.” The loyalty of most whites therefore does not extend past their close kin. As Dr. Salter puts it, “They are, in effect, leaving their ethnic genetic capital to chance — the vagueries of nature and the good-will of competing groups.”
The Left, in particular, insists that people should act as atomized individuals with no ethnic loyalty. Dr. Salter compares this kind of detachment from ethnicity with the way a Martian might view humans. He notes also that the Left no longer even accepts democratic results if people vote to preserve their own ethnies. The destruction of the Vlaams Blok in Belgium because of its “racist” commitment to keeping Flanders Flemish is a recent example. Likewise, the Left constantly calls the Freedom Party in Austria, the Peoples Party in Denmark, the National Front in France, and the British National Party “anti-democratic.” Of course, there is nothing in their platforms against representative government. Apparently, the desire of a white ethny to preserve itself is so outrageous it cannot be accommodated by democratic means.
One of the most damaging current ideological tactics is to try to persuade a people that it is a “credal” or “universal” nation that needs no biological continuity. As Dr. Salter explains, “It is in practice a formula for reconciling, or blinding ethnic majorities to their own decline while serving the sectional interests of minorities and free riding elites.” He continues:
A concept nation is incapable of principled defense against ethnic replacement. The doctrine is as pathological as a conception of the family that did not allow parents to show preference for their children.
This point is worth underlining: Telling people to give up racial loyalty is the moral equivalent of telling parents to be indifferent to their children.
As a practical matter, this kind of propaganda is directed only at whites, and it is only whites who are susceptible to it.
Dr. Salter quotes a person he describes as Australia’s senior demographer:
Some people think that a steady replacement of Anglo-Celts by other ethnic groups is highly desirable . . . Personally, [replacement of Anglo-Celts] does not worry me so long as ‘Australian values’ remain: free speech; freedom of religious worship; equality of the sexes; reasonable equality between social classes (i.e. no aristocracy); and so on.
Probably no Chinese or Nigerian has ever expressed official indifference to the prospect of extinction for his own people.
Dr. Salter hopes that a broader understanding of genetic interests will lead to more sensible public policies. He argues that aside from the strong desire to protect one’s immediate family, humans do not have very strong instincts to protect their genetic interests and that “the set of mechanisms for recognizing and investing in ethnies has become inadequate and often downright maladaptive.” He points out that people have genetic interests, whether they are conscious of them or not, and that they may have to be educated about them. He concedes, however, that “incorporating genetic interests into social theory will be a large undertaking . . .”
The White Dilemma
Much of this large undertaking will involve persuading white “anti-racists” that ethnic loyalty is as legitimate — perhaps even more legitimate — than family loyalty. Dr. Salter writes that “if it is adaptive for a parent to make sacrifices for a family containing a total genetic interest of a few children, it is easy to conclude that efforts to preserve a population carrying the equivalent of thousands or millions of children must be at least as adaptive.” Yet, he concedes, “[T]his commonsense proposition is controversial . . .”
It is controversial, however, only in certain circles; not all groups have abandoned ethnic loyalty to the same degree. Non-whites in their own nations, and non-white minorities within white nations show considerable racial solidarity. It is only whites who must be convinced that they lose something precious if their ethny is displaced. As Dr. Salter concedes, “One either feels protective about genetic interests or not,” and most whites have been trained not to feel protective.
That they could even be trained to lose interest in something vital probably reflects something distinctive about whites, and if whites do not regain their solidarity they will be replaced by groups that never lost it. Dr. Salter puts it this way: “Indiscriminate altruism such as foregoing reproduction to aid nonkin to reproduce, will weed out the genes that code for such behaviour, if maintained over many generations.”
Indiscriminate altruism is not universal. It is probably correct to say that it is only whites who set up racial preferences for minorities, who adopt children of other races, or face dispossession through immigration. When whites took possession of North America, Australia, and New Zealand, they set aside territory for the exclusive use of the natives they displaced, giving them at least a minimal base for ethnic preservation. Non-whites who displace whites will not establish homelands for them.
Dr. Salter also points out that throughout human history, ethnic loyalty has been the norm, and that it is unlikely that true wisdom was discovered only recently by a few whites. “It is more rational,” he argues, “to assume that the absence of ethnic duty is a bold experiment, and possibly an immoral one.”
“A nation can take centuries to form,” writes Dr. Salter. “But as several Western societies have experienced, it takes a lapse of only one or two decades in immigration control for an economically successful society to find its unity broken and heading for genetic replacement.”
On Genetic Interests is a powerful argument in defense of all ethnies. Let us hope it will be most widely read by the ones that need it the most.